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ABSTRACT 
Policymakers, military leaders, and political analysts alike have been pondering whether 
the United States should support regime change in Iran.  Iranian regime change supports 
U.S.. national interests in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
stemming human rights abuses, promoting civil liberties, and encouraging a more 
Western-friendly regime.  The Green Movement has risen as a social movement in Iran 
that could challenge the regime and force regime reform.  However, the Green Movement 
needs external support to be successful before the current regime develops a nuclear 
weapons capability.  Analysis of the strengths and weakness of the Iranian regime and the 
Green Movement is used to identify opportunities and consequences of U.S.. 
intervention.  Game theory is used to identify the best course of action for U.S.. 
intervention in Iran.  The analysis in this thesis determines that U.S.. covert support of the 
Green Movement using elements of soft power, such as psychological operations, 
computer network operations, and unconventional warfare, is the best means to enhance 
the Green Movement’s ability to affect regime reform.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
What would the consequences be were the United States to intervene in some manner to 
support regime change in Iran?  A large number of Iranian citizens are voicing their 
dissatisfaction with the Iranian regime over issues of human rights abuses, the lack of 
civil liberties, the absolute authority of the Supreme Leader, and the declining economy 
of the country.  Through protests and demonstrations, an opposition movement is 
strengthening their campaign against the current regime and demanding major changes in 
the Iranian government.  The United States, in support of its national interests, may 
choose to assist the opposition to force change in Iran’s current regime.  The thesis 
analyzes the strengths and weakness of both the current Iranian regime and the major 
opposition movement, the Green Movement.  The feasibility of successful regime change 
is then deduced.  Next, the thesis examines the possible courses of actions the United 
States can take to facilitate the Green Movement in affecting regime reform.  Ultimately, 
this thesis provides United States policymakers analysis of the opportunities and 
consequences resulting from intervention in Iran.  This analysis will assist policymakers 
in determining how the United States should proceed in dealing with Iran.   
U.S.. national interests support the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the stop 
to human rights abuses, and the abolishment of support for terrorist organizations.  The 
current Iranian regime is guilty of all of these violations.  Thus far, U.S.. sanctions 
against Iran have been ineffectual to affect satisfactory change.  The Green Movement in 
Iran is demanding changes in the Iranian regime that mesh with U.S.. national interests.  
However, the Green Movement may not be successful in effecting change without 
outside support.  
 The methodology in this thesis is to first determine whether the United States 
should intervene in Iranian affairs.  Given that the United States does not want to get 
involved where success is unlikely, there must first be a determination of whether the 
Green Movement has a realistic chance of success with or without U.S.. support.  The 
strengths and weaknesses of both the Iranian regime and the Green Movement are 
analyzed to determine the feasibility of success of the Green Movement.  Game theory is 
 xiv
then used to determine the best course of action, should the United States choose to assist 
the Green Movement in affecting regime reform.  This thesis determined that, out of three 
possible courses of action (no intervention, covert intervention, and overt intervention), 
U.S.. covert support of the Green Movement using elements of soft power is the best 
strategy. 
 Strengths and weaknesses of the Iranian regime are identified using variables 
within the PMESII model.  Each variable is discussed as to how each positively and 
negatively affects the regime.  Each variable is ranked on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = very weak 
to 5= very strong) to give a numerical scoring of how the regime stands on a relative 
scale.  The variable scores were averaged to get an overall score for each article in the 
PMESII model.  Finally, the score for each article is averaged to give an overall score for 
the strength of the regime.   
Social Movement Theory is used to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Green Movement.  The Green Movement’s shared grievances are identified, as well as its 
political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes.  The result is a 
qualitative assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Green Movement and a 
determination that the Green Movement is a social movement.  The Green Movement’s 
standing as a social movement indicates that it is a viable threat to the Iranian regime. 
 This thesis used game theory as a tool because game theory outcomes very often 
reflect real-life outcomes.  When game theory is applied to the question of whether the 
United States should intervene in Iranian affairs and how, it was determined that the 
United States should covertly support the Green Movement.  There are several reasons 
for this outcome.  First, U.S.. intervention is necessary in order for the Green Movement 
to succeed in the near future.  Without U.S.. intervention, the Green Movement will 
either take years to affect regime reform, or the Green Movement may never succeed.  
Another factor in why game theory determined that U.S.. intervention is preferable is 
because, if the Green Movement succeeds in regime reform in part because of U.S.. 
assistance, the United States will likely have more influence in the reform-minded Iranian 
regime.  This influence can help the United States in accomplishing its national security 
interests.    
 xv
U.S.. intervention in Iran using instruments of soft power designed to promote 
reform and weaken the Iranian regime would likely yield results if undertaken in a covert 
fashion. While diplomatic efforts of engagement and persuasion and economic sanctions 
might achieve regime reform in time, it would likely occur after Iran developed a nuclear 
weapons capability.  The Green Movement has shown the ability to frame messages that 
appeal to diverse groups of Iranians, mobilize large groups, and encourage the potential 
for political opportunities through political elites.  Without U.S.. support, the Green 
Movement is unlikely to grow and organize into a force sufficiently strong enough to 
make regime reform a reality.  The current regime will be able to continue to suppress the 
Green Movement and eventually relegate it to the level of a nuisance effort.  U.S.. covert 
support to the Green Movement is necessary for it to achieve a tipping point that pushes 
the current regime towards reform.  If U.S.. support is not provided, the next opportunity 





The current Iranian regime presents a wide range of problems for United States 
foreign policy.  These issues include human rights violations, support of regional and 
international terrorism, threats against the United States and its allies, constant disruption 
and opposition to any Arab-Israeli peace process, a nuclear program that could result in a 
nuclear weapons capability, and regional instability.  With the array of issues and 
concerns with the current regime in Iran, an assessment needs to be made on whether or 
not the regime is vulnerable to reform through internal pressure alone or if external actors 
could help tip the balance toward reform. 
A significant number of Iranian citizens are voicing their dissatisfaction with the 
Iranian regime over issues of human rights abuses, the absolute authority of the Supreme 
Leader, the declining economy of the country, and the lack of freedoms of speech, 
assembly, and thought.1  These dissatisfactions reached a climax after the controversial 
Iranian elections of June 12, 2009, when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-
elected under perceived fraudulent means.  Major opposition parties, traditional clerical 
circles, and influential Iranian politicians questioned the legitimacy of his presidency.  
Many Iranians took to the streets in protest asking “Where is my vote?” and demanded 
free and honest elections.2  A large opposition movement, called the Green Movement, 
was born.  The Green Movement increased the number of protests and strengthened their 
campaign against the current regime, demanding complete regime change or major 
reforms in the Iranian government.  However, the exact path the Green Movement will 
take is currently unclear.3  Presently, it is not clear whether the end result will be 
revolutionary change or reform of the system.  However, what is clear is that in order for 
the Green Movement to be successful it needs to overcome its two biggest challenges: 
                                                 
1 Rachel Bevilaccqua, “Free Iran: The Time is Now,” revmagdalen.blogspot.com, December 6, 2009, 
http://revmagdalen.blogspot.com/2009/12/free-iran-the-time-is-now.html (accessed February 20, 2010). 
2 Behzad Yaghmaian, “Iran’s Green Movement Spreading Despite Crackdown,” payvand.com, 
November 15, 2009, http://payvand.com/news/09/nov/1157.html (accessed February 19, 2010).  
3 Mohammad Tahavori, “Interview with Dr. Banuazizi: About the Green Movement,” gozaar.org, 
December 29, 2009, http://www.gozaar.org/template1.php?id=1403&language=english.html (accessed 
February 20, 2010). 
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institutionalizing the movement and clearly and realistically defining its goals.4  Once the 
opposition overcomes these first two obstacles, it may still need help in winning over 
moderates and overcoming the Iranian regime. 
The opposition may have the means to succeed.  It appears at first look that public 
sentiment vastly is in favor of radical changes to the government.  However, public 
outcry may not be enough.  Questions remain if leadership in the regime will be willing 
to go against the president and Supreme Leader to support the demands of the opposition 
movement.  Complete regime reform maybe the only way for enough of the opposition’s 
demands to be met.  Another question is whether demonstrations are enough to cause 
reform or regime change.  Militant opposition may be necessary to forcefully oust the 
current regime leaders.  Whether the opposition movement follows the path of peaceful 
demonstrations like the Green Movement, or the more violent path of some of the 
militant opposition groups, or a combination of the two, success may not be assured 
without proper framing of the cause and dissemination of information to spur more 
moderate Iranian citizens and leaders to action.  This is where an outside actor, like the 
United States, could play a crucial role in effecting reform.  If outside help is provided, it 
must not have a direct connection to the United States.  A connection to the United States 
would allow the Iranian regime to portray the opposition movement as an instrument of 
the United States and play on the mistrust the Iranian people have for U.S.. motives in the 
Middle East.  
A.  THE PROBLEM 
Iran is the big gorilla sitting quietly in the middle of the room.  It is unprovoked at 
the moment, but could be potentially very dangerous.  The United States has been waging 
war for nine years in countries adjacent to Iran, and yet the United States is seemingly 
ignoring the even greater regional threat of Iran itself.  Iran could soon acquire a nuclear 
weapons capability, which would directly pose a threat to the United States and its allies. 
Moreover, a nuclear weapons capability would quickly make Iran a regional hegemony 
striking fear in neighboring countries and stirring other Middle Eastern nations in a race 
                                                 
4 Tahavori, “Interview with Dr. Banuazizi.” 
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to acquire their own nuclear weapons.  In addition, Iran is the most active state sponsor of 
terrorism and a supporter of anti-American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.5   
Despite Iran’s influence in the region, there exists the potential for reform.  The 
opposition movement in Iran threatens the current Iranian regime and could affect 
changes that mesh with U.S.. national interests. 
Policymakers, military leaders, and political analysts alike have been pondering 
whether or not the United States should support regime reform in Iran.  The problem is 
that policymakers do not have an analysis that will help them determine how the United 
States should proceed.  There are many questions related to this issue.  Is United States 
involvement necessary to ensure the opposition movement’s success?  Is the best option 
to stay out of Iranian affairs in order to protect the opposition movement’s credibility?  
How does Iranian regime reform support U.S.. national interests?  What could some 
detrimental effects of U.S.. involvement be? 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide U.S.. policymakers analysis of the 
opportunities and consequences resulting from intervention in Iran.  Options include both 
involvement and noninvolvement.  This analysis will assist policymakers in determining 
whether the United States should support Iranian regime reform.   
It is in U.S.. national interests to assist in Iranian regime reform to: 1) stem the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons for our own national security and that of our allies, 2) 
hamper aid to terrorist organizations that can do harm to the United States and or our 
allies, 3) reduce disruption of the Middle East Peace process, and 4) end human rights 
violations.6  The current Iranian regime is guilty of all of these violations, and U.S.. 
national policy seeks to stem these violations.7   The United States’ position on the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which includes nuclear weapons 
                                                 
5 “State Sponsors of Terrorism: Iran,” www.state.gov, April 30, 2009,  http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ 
rls/crt/ 2008/122436.htm (accessed on April 12, 2010). 
6 “Policy Issues,” www.state.gov, http://www.state.gov/policy/ (accessed April 12, 2010). 
7 “Iran,” www.state.gov, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm (accessed April 12, 2010). 
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capabilities, is made clear in the UN Security Council Resolution 1540.  The United 
States and its United Nations allies will “enforce effective measures against the 
proliferation of WMD . . . to ensure that no State or non-State actor is a source or 
beneficiary of WMD proliferation.”8  According to the U.S.. State Department Country 
Reports on Terrorism, Iran remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism.  Iran’s 
involvement in the planning and financial support of terrorist attacks throughout the 
Middle East, Europe, and Central Asia had a direct impact on international efforts to 
promote peace, threatened economic stability in the Gulf, and undermined the growth of 
democracy.  Iran continues to disrupt the Middle East peace through its support for 
Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Palestinian terrorist groups.9  As for human rights, the 
United States government is committed to “hold governments accountable to their 
obligations under universal human rights norms and international human rights 
instruments.”10  Thus far, the United States has been unable to deter Iran, through 
diplomacy or sanctions, from committing these violations. 11 However, the United States 
may be able to affect satisfactory change to Iran’s violations of widely accepted 
international policies.  The opposition movement in Iran is demanding reforms in the 
Iranian regime that mesh with U.S.. national interests.  However, the opposition 
movement may not be successful in effecting reform without external support.   
Regime reform falls within U.S.. national interests, but should we intervene?  If 
the opposition movement is successful, it could force change to these policy violations 
from within, without additional external intervention.  Because there is the potential for 
Iran to remedy these violations internally, U.S.. intervention should only be considered if 
the opposition movement cannot succeed on its own. 
                                                 
8 “UN Security Council Resolution 1540,” www.state.gov, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/ c18943.htm 
(accessed on April 12, 2010). 
9 “State Sponsors of Terrorism: Iran,” www.state.gov, April 30, 2009,  http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ 
rls/crt/ 2008/122436.htm (accessed on April 12, 2010). 
10 “Human Rights,” www.state.gov, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/index.htm (accessed on April 12, 
2010). 
11 “Iran Sanctions: Options, Opportunities and Consequences,” www.brookings.edu, December 15, 
2009, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/testimonies/2009/1215_iran_sanctions_maloney/ 
1215iran _sanctions_maloney.pdf (accessed April 12, 2010). 
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The combination of a weak Iranian regime and a strong opposition movement 
produces the most likely chance of successful United States intervention.   The United 
States does not want to support a fight in which it may lose, so the first step is to assess 
the feasibility of successful regime reform by examining the strengths and weaknesses of 
both the Iranian regime and the opposition movement.  If the Iranian regime is 
determined to be sufficiently strong and the opposition movement is determined to be 
sufficiently weak, the opposition movement will likely fail.  Conversely, if the regime is 
sufficiently weak and the opposition movement is sufficiently strong, there is a chance of 
successful regime reform.  It is under these conditions that the United States would start 
to consider involvement to assist the opposition movement.   
There are many opportunities for the United States if it chooses involvement to 
support Iranian regime reform.  Under the conditions that the United States supports the 
opposition movement and the opposition movement successfully affects regime reform, 
the United States would be in a position to enhance its influence in the region.  As an 
instrumental backer of the opposition movement’s rise to power, U.S.. interests will 
likely carry weight when reforms to Iranian laws and policies are considered under the 
new or reformed Iranian leadership.  Several of these U.S.. national interests include the 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the stop to human rights abuses, and the 
abolishment of support for terrorist organizations.  U.S.. influence with a new Iranian 
leadership may be successful in achieving our national interests.  Josh Shahryar, a 
journalist and human rights activist, expounds on how a new Iranian government could 
likely be a useful ally to democratic nations:  
If the Green Movement succeeds, it will create a democratic nation which 
would very likely end up being an ally of other democratic nations against 
dictatorships in the Middle East . . . Iran could be reasoned with so it 
would stop funding Hamas and Hezbollah and sending IEDs to Taliban in 
Afghanistan and al-Qaeda in Iraq.  Helping them [Green Movement] is 
essentially furthering U.S.. interests in the region.12  
                                                 
12 Josh Shahryar, “Can the U.S.. Help Iran’s Green Movement?,” huffingtonpost.com, April 3, 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-shahryar/can-the-us-help-irans-gre_b_524168.html (accessed April 7, 
2010). 
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Consequences of U.S.. involvement are equally important to examine.  Overt 
U.S.. support could weaken opposition movement credibility.  The opposition movement 
could be viewed as an instrument of the U.S.. government.  Or, if U.S.. support is 
provided and the opposition movement fails, U.S.. credibility is weakened in the eyes of 
the international community.  The United States could be viewed as a nation that, yet 
again, does not have the ability to successfully support or enable fledgling democratic 
states.   
In addition to determining the strengths and weaknesses of the Iranian regime and 
the opposition movement, as well as identifying opportunities and consequences of U.S.. 
intervention, there are several other issues that arise.  First, what can be done to exploit 
regime weaknesses?  Second, what reactions from the regime can be expected if the 
United States intervenes in Iranian affairs?  Third, if the opposition movement is 
determined to be a social movement, does this mean that its likelihood of success is high?  
Fourth, does the opposition movement need U.S.. support?  Does it want U.S.. support?  
If not, is U.S.. support still in the opposition movement’s best interests to enhance its 
likelihood of success?  Finally, what are the steps for an outside actor to effect weakening 
the Iranian regime and strengthening the opposition movement? 
C.  METHODOLOGY 
There are three questions that United States policymakers must answer when it 
comes to international conflicts of crisis.  The first is: Do the issues within the conflict 
fall within U.S.. national interests?  The second is: Can the conflict be resolved without 
U.S.. intervention?  The third is: Should the United States intervene?  The first question 
can be answered by examining U.S.. national interests that are related to the conflict.  The 
second question can be answered by analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
current Iranian regime and the opposition movement.  The third question can be answered 
by determining the opportunities and consequences of U.S.. intervention. 
The methodology utilized in this thesis is to first determine if the United States 
should intervene in Iranian affairs.  Given that the United States does not want to get 
involved in something where success is unlikely, there must first be a determination of 
 7
whether the opposition movement has a realistic chance of success with or without U.S.. 
support.  The strengths and weaknesses of both the Iranian regime and the opposition 
movement are analyzed to determine the feasibility of success of the opposition 
movement.  Next, we analyze the opportunities and consequences of several possible 
forms of U.S.. involvement.  This analysis highlights which form of intervention (or non-
intervention) is the most appealing.  Finally, game theory is used to determine the best 
course of action the United States and the opposition movement should take.  A 
discussion of the results is intended to help policymakers make an informed decision on 




























Figure 1.  Methodology Flow Diagram 
 
1. Assessing Current Strengths 
 The strengths and weaknesses of both the Iranian regime and the opposition 
movement need to be analyzed to determine the feasibility of success of the opposition 
movement.  An initial assessment will indicate if the opposition movement even has a 
chance of success.  It is our contention that the opposition movement has a chance at 
affecting successful regime reform only if the Iranian regime is sufficiently weak and the 
opposition movement is sufficient strong.  In all other cases, the opposition movement 






















Figure 2.  Conditions Indicating the Chance of Iranian Regime Reform 
 
However, the degree to which the regime is strong and the opposition movement 
is weak is also a factor.  If the opposition movement is only marginally too weak to affect 
regime reform, the United States could affect some of the opposition movement’s 
weaknesses to make them stronger, thus giving them a better chance of success. 
 
 









Figure 3.  Example of the Degree of 
Strength of the Iranian Regime and the 















Figure 4.  Example of the Degree of 
Strength of the Iranian Regime and the 
Opposition Movement with U.S.. 
Assistance 
 
2. Assessing the Regime 
Quantifying Iranian regime strength can be accomplished by analyzing different 
aspects of the government and assigning each aspect a relative value.  The PMESII 
(Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information) model can be used 
to analyze the Iranian regime.   A full picture of the overall strengths and weaknesses of 
the Iranian regime can be assessed by analyzing the Iranian regime through each article 
of PMESII.   
 Each article (Political, Military, Economic, etc.) of the PMESII model can have 
multiple variables that can be used to assess the article’s strength.  Each variable can be 
ranked on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = very weak to 5= very strong) to give a numerical scoring 






































an overall score for each article in the PMESII model.  Finally, the score for each article 
will be averaged to give an overall score for the strength of the regime.   
 From an analysis of the Iranian regime, the overall strength of the regime can be 
determined.  The major strengths and the major weaknesses can also be identified.  These 
results can help determine if the Iranian regime is weak enough for the opposition 
movement to affect reform.  The results can also indicate whether or not the Green 
Movement will need to join forces with one or more of the armed political groups that 
also oppose the current Iranian regime, or if the opposition movement will need 
assistance from an outside actor, like the United States, in order for Iranian regime reform 
to be feasible. 
3. Assessing the Opposition Movement 
The strengths and weaknesses of the opposition movement can be assessed by 
using social movement theory.  Social movement theory looks at groups of people with 
shared grievances.  Through collective action, these groups become powerful forces in 
affecting changes in their society.  However, large numbers of people with shared 
grievances is often not enough to affect reform.  Groups with shared grievances need 
political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes to be successful in 
affecting significant change.13  
There is a higher chance of success if the opposition movement in Iran has all the 
characteristics to qualify it as a social movement.  Having all the characteristics of a 
social movement would indicate that the opposition movement has processes in place to 
be a viable threat to the Iranian regime.  As a viable threat, the Iranian regime will be 
compelled to do something by attempting to crush the movement, giving in to the 
movement’s demands, or reaching some form of compromise.  If the opposition 
movement cannot be deemed a social movement with all of the necessary characteristics, 
                                                 
13 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing 
structures, and framing processes—toward synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements,” in 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. 
Zald, 1-20 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2. 
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it has little feasibility of success and will likely be seen as an easier adversary that the 
regime can crush.   
The methodology in using social movement theory will allow for the 
determination of whether the opposition movement in Iran will have a chance of success 
as a collective action, and, in the end, if it can succeed in affecting regime reform.  This 
analysis will also allow for a determination whether outside support is necessary in order 
for the opposition to succeed.   
The third step in our methodology is to analyze the opportunities and 
consequences of intervention.  Opportunities and consequences apply both to the United 
States and to the opposition movement.  Potential opportunities that arise from Iranian 
regime reform include the abolishment of support for terrorist organizations, reduced 
disruption in the Middle East peace process, cooperation towards non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, improved human rights, and increased civil liberties for the Iranian 
people.  Potential consequences of intervention include the loss of credibility of the 
opposition movement, increased human rights violations, increased disruption of the 
Middle East peace process, and interference of oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz.   
4. Using Game Theory to Test Predictions 
The final step in our methodology is to use game theory to test predictions about 
the outcomes of possible intervention.  Game theory is a mathematical tool that captures 
behaviors in strategic situations and can be used to reasonably predict the outcome of a 
conflict.  Although there are many factors—including unpredictable ones—that 
determine how a conflict plays out, game theory also allows players to find strategies or 
alliances that allow them to negotiate a settlement that is sufficiently satisfactory to all.   
One benefit of game theory is it can determine the most likely outcome and the 
best compromise solution between multiple players.  The game that will be played here 
has three players: the Iranian regime, the opposition movement, and the United States.  In 
a three player game there can be coalitions between players which will affect the 
outcome.  If the opposition movement forms a coalition with the United States, it may 
have a better chance of ending up with more satisfying outcome.  In addition to 
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identifying which, and how, the options should be played, game theory will give a 
predictable assessment of whether or not the United States will need to support the 
opposition movement for it to be successful in affecting Iranian regime reform.   
D.  CHAPTER REVIEW 
The beginning of Chapter I describes the current political situation in Iran.  Next, 
the problem section indentifies that policymakers do not have an analysis that will help 
them determine if United States should support regime reform in Iran.  Then, the purpose 
and scope section identifies U.S.. national interests in Iranian regime reform, and poses 
the question of whether or not the United States should intervene in Iranian affairs.  
Finally, Chapter I outlines the methodology used to analyze the strengths and weaknesses 
of the Iranian regime and the opposition movement, identifies the opportunities and 
consequences of involvement, and tests predicted outcomes using game theory.  The 
intent of this research is to assist policymakers in understanding the opportunities and 
consequences of U.S.. involvement in Iranian regime reform.  
Chapter II examines the Iranian regime.  The variables of PMESII are evaluated 
in order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the Iranian regime.  These variables 
will be defined and used to provide a quantitative analysis of the regime as described in 
the methodology section of Chapter I.  The areas of PMESII that are assessed as weak are 
further analyzed and potential methods of exploitation are proposed.   
Chapter III examines the opposition movement.  The strengths and weaknesses of 
the opposition movement are analyzed using social movement theory.  An analysis of the 
shared grievances and the three elements of social movement theory are conducted as 
described in the methodology section of Chapter I.  The conclusion of this analysis 
provides a qualitative assessment of the opposition movement to determine if it qualifies 
as a viable social movement and if the opposition movement is strong enough to effect 
regime reform.  
Chapter IV examines the question of whether or not Iranian regime reform falls 
within United States interests.  Next, the opportunities and consequences of United States 
intervention in Iran are assessed in three areas.  First, the opportunities and consequences 
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of non-intervention are examined.  Second, the opportunities and consequences of covert 
United States intervention in Iran are examined.  Third, the opportunities and 
consequences of overt United States intervention in Iran are examined.   
Chapter V uses game theory to show the likely outcomes of U.S.. intervention 
options using the analysis conducted in Chapters II and III, and the courses of action and 
opportunities and consequences described in Chapter IV.   
In Chapter VI, the thesis conclusion summarizes the results of the analysis in 
Chapters II, III, and IV, the results of the game theory in Chapter V, and policy 
implications related to this analysis.  Areas for future analysis will also be addressed.     
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II.  ANALYZING THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF 
THE IRANIAN REGIME USING PMESII  
Despite public outcry over the Iranian regime’s economic mismanagement and 
indications of schisms in the regime’s political leaders, political observers say that the 
regime is still very strong and is not likely to collapse.14 The government is bolstered by 
a strong military and security apparatus that has a vested political and economic interest 
in the current regime.  The regime is willing to use force to quell public protests, and is 
not above arresting and torturing activists, demonstrators, and journalists who speak out 
against the regime.15  The regime has several mechanisms to carry out its rule of law to 
include the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), regular military forces, the Basij, 
intelligence services, and domestic police forces.  The IRGC, with an estimated strength 
of 125,000, is indispensible to the survival of the regime by acting as a counterbalance to 
the Iranian Regular Army.16 The Basij, which falls under the control of the IRGC, is a 
type of voluntary national police force with an estimated strength of 300,000 and the 
ability to mobilize one million registered voters.17  The Basij is tasked in policing 
demonstrations and ensuring behavioral codes and Islamic morality. 18 Because of the 
regime’s strength in its security apparatuses, any opposition movement will face a strong 
challenge from the regime if they hope to succeed. 
In order to assess whether an opposition movement has the chance to succeed, an 
analysis of the regime must be done. The strengths and weaknesses of the Iranian regime 
need to be analyzed to determine the feasibility of success of the opposition movement.  
An initial assessment will indicate if the opposition movement even has a chance of 
                                                 
14 David E. Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership 
Dynamics  (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010). 
15 Martin Milinski, “The Islamic Republic of Iran,” yaQoot.com, December 10, 2009,  
http://www.yaqoot.com/Iran.html (accessed February 25, 2010). 
16 Milinski, “The Islamic Republic of Iran.” 
17  “Janes,” Janes.com, December 7, 2009, http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView.do? 
docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2008/jir10416.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keywor
d=basij&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JIR& (accessed March 8,2010)   
18 Milinski, “The Islamic Republic of Iran.” 
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success.  Assessment for the strength of the Iranian regime will be done through 
evaluating six articles: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and 
information (PMESII).  Each of these articles will be assessed to determine if the regime 
is strong enough to resist the opposition movement.  Furthermore, there may be areas that 
can be exploited by the international community or the opposition movement to weaken 
the regime so that it may be more susceptible to reform.  Each article of the PMESII 
model can have multiple variables that can be used to assess the article’s strength.  Each 
variable can be ranked on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = very weak to 5 = very strong) to give a 
numerical scoring of how the regime stands on a relative scale.  The variable scores will 
be averaged to get an overall score for each article in the PMESII model.  Finally, the 
score for each article will be averaged to give an overall score for the strength of the 
regime. 
Under the political article of PMESII, the four variables that will be used to assess 
political strength are legitimacy of the state, widespread violation of human rights, civil 
liberties, and when the military acts as an independent economic and political entity.  
The legitimacy of the state is when the state has the ability to command public 
loyalty, create positive public perceptions of the election process, and the ability to 
generate domestic support for government legislation and policies.19  Widespread 
violation of human rights is the emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule, 
the rise in political prisoners and political violence, and the widespread abuse of legal, 
political and social rights.  Civil liberties are rights and freedoms that protect an 
individual from the state, such as rights freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the right 
to due process, and to privacy.20  When the military acts as an independent economic and 




                                                 
19 “Failed and Fragile States,” Country Indicators for Foreign Policy.org, http://www.carleton.ca/ cifp 
/app/ffs_data_methodology.php (accessed August 3, 2010). 
20 “Civil Liberties,”Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civilliberties (accessed August 3, 
2010). 
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or state-supported private militias that terrorize those seen to be sympathetic to the 
opposition, and the emergence of an “army within an army” that serves the interests of 
the dominant military or political clique.21  
Under the military article of PMESII, two variables that will be used to assess 
military strength are the number of security forces able to suppress opposition and the 
public’s view toward the security forces.  It also identifies the government’s ability to 
quell uprisings.  If the number of security forces is high enough and the regime is willing 
to use them against its own people, the opposition movement could be crushed quickly, 
especially if the opposition movement turns violent and the regime has a legitimate 
excuse to counter with violence.  Finally, the public’s perception of the security forces 
could also indicate the regime’s ability to quell an uprising.  If the public respects the 
authority of the security forces, the public is more likely to obey the security force’s 
orders to disband.   
Under the economic article of PMESII, the two variables that will be used to 
evaluate economic strength are the uneven economic development along group lines and 
severe economic decline.22  Uneven economic development along group lines includes 
group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, economic status, 
poverty levels, and education levels.  Severe economic decline includes a pattern of 
progressive economic decline of the society as measured by per capita income, Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), debt, poverty levels, and other economic measures.23 
Under the social article of PMESII, the two variables that will be used to evaluate 
social strength are education rates and the United Nations Human Development Indices.  
Education rates reflect the percentage of the country that has obtained a primary and 
secondary level education.  Human development indices combine United Nations data on 
life expectancy, adult literacy rate (age 15 and above), combined gross enrollment rate in 
                                                 
21 “Iran,” fundforpeace.org, 2008, http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_ 
content&task=view&id=397&Itemid=556  (accessed March 4, 2010). 
22 “Iran,” fundforpeace.org, 2008, http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_ 
content&task=view&id=397&Itemid=556  (accessed March 4, 2010). 
23 “Iran,” fundforpeace.org, 2008, http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_ 
content&task=view&id=397&Itemid=556  (accessed March 4, 2010). 
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schools, and GDP per capita into a single score in order to measure the progress of 
human development in the country.24   
Under the infrastructure article of PMESII, the three variables that will be used to 
assess the strength of the infrastructure are telecommunications capability, the 
availability of road, rail and airport systems, and the regime’s ability to provide the 
people with food, water, and sewer.   
Under the information article of PMESII, the two variables that will be used to 
assess the strength of information are the changes in freedom of press and the 
government’s control over access to media sources (Internet, mobile phone, and satellite 
TV).  Evaluating changes in these indicators can indicate how much uncensored 
information can be accessed by the population. The more informed people are, the more 
likely they will pick sides in support of, or against, the Iranian regime.  
A. POLITICAL 
The Islamic government lead by Grand Ayatollah Khamenei is still perceived as a 
legitimate authority by a majority of the Iranian people. While the opposition movement 
does present some challenge to the current regime, it appears that the regime is still 
politically strong.   The regime appears to have solid public support and has thus far been 
able to limit the size and effectiveness of the opposition movement.  Prior to the 2009 
presidential elections, a 2006 World Public Opinion poll showed that Iranians gave a 6.9 
on a scale of 0–10 when asked if they felt that the country was governed by 
representatives elected by the people.25  After the June 2009 elections, stronger doubts 
arose about the legitimacy of the electoral process and the government as a whole.  A 
series of polls were consolidated and analyzed by WorldPublicOpinion.org in the months 
after the election.   The results, published in February 2010, demonstrated that a large 
majority of the Iranian public viewed the election process as fair and that Mahmoud 
                                                 
24 “Human Development Report 2009—Iran,” UnitedNations.org, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/ 
countries/ country  fact_sheets/cty_fs_IRN.html (accessed August 4, 2010). 
25 “Iranians: Do They Say They Want a Revolution?,” WorldPublicOpinion.org,  July 19, 2007, 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/379.php?lb=brme&pnt=379&nid=
&id= (accessed May 17, 2010). 
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Ahmadinejad was legitimately elected.26  When the Iranian people where asked about 
their satisfaction with the electoral process, 81 percent of Iranians stated they were either 
satisfied or very satisfied.27  When asked about the legitimacy of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejhad’s presidency, over 70 percent of Iranians viewed it as legitimate.28  When 
it came to the power of the Supreme Leader, 61 percent of Iranians agreed that he had the 
necessary amount of power.29  The Iranian people gave positive marks—5.9 on a scale of 
0–10—when asked if the country was governed according to the will of the people.30  
Over all, polling shows that 85 percent of the Iranian people are satisfied with the current 
government system in Iran.31  These polling numbers indicate that the regime still has a 
strong base of support among the Iranian people and has not suffered any significant loss 
of legitimacy.   
When it comes to human rights, Khamenei lays a strong Islamic foundation in his 
guidance: “Islam safeguards human rights and human dignity, guarantees morality and 
virtue, and promotes peace and security.  The most unacceptable and unfair allegation has 
been leveled against Islam by those who accuse Islam of being opposed to human rights, 
civilization, and security.  And they use this accusation against Muslim nations in order 
to justify their oppressive thirst for power.”32  Khamenei called human rights “a 
fundamental principle underlying Islamic teachings, which precedes Western concerns 
for human rights by many centuries.”33  There is strong support among the Iranian people 
when it comes to their views of the Iranian regime’s respect for human rights.  When 
                                                 
26 "An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public,"WorldPublicOpinion.org,  Februaury 3,2010, 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb10/IranElection_Feb10_rpt.pdf (accessed May16, 2010).  
27 "An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public," 13. 
28 "An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public," 16. 
29 "An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public," 16. 
30 "An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public," 19. 
31 “Iranians: Do They Say They Want a Revolution?,” WorldPublicOpinion.org,  July 19, 2007, 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/379.php?lb=brme&pnt=379&nid=
&id= (accessed May 17, 2010). 
32 “The Supreme Leaders Generation of Wealth,” The Center for Publishing and Preserving the 
Works of the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_ content&task 
=view &id =1230 &Itemid=13 (accessed May 20, 2010). 
33 “Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,” LabbickOnline.ir, http://www.labbaik.ir/en/ uploads /book/ 
Supreme% 20Leader%20of%20World.pdf (accessed March 18, 2010). 
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polled, 70 percent of Iranians agreed that the regime had respect for human rights.34  
However, on the Failed State Index, Iran received a 9.4 on a 1-10 scale, with 10 being the 
worst possible score.35  While the international community may view Iran’s human rights 
record as very poor, from a perspective of trying to find exploitable weaknesses in Iran, it 
is the Iranian people’s perception that matters most.  
The IRGC’s expansion into the economic and political realms of Iran presents the 
appearance of a state within a state.  The IRGC plays a dominant role in the 
telecommunications, construction, and oil industries.  The IRGC has successfully denied 
foreign competition in the telecommunications infrastructure that would have competed 
with companies the IRGC owns.  The IRGC owned conglomerate Gharargah Sazandegi-
ye Khatam al-Anbia has become so large that it routinely underbids private companies 
for construction, civil engineering projects, oil and gas infrastructure development 
projects, and has taken over public enterprises to expand its influence.36 The IRGC uses 
its ability to site national security issues, government protections, access to financing 
from Iranian banks and its own enterprises to outbid competition and avoid 
accountability.37 
The IRGC has strengthened its role in the political direction of the regime.  Many 
Iranian political figures have IRGC roots.  President Ahmadinejad is a former IRGC 
commander, and former IRGC officers have become governors of several provinces.  
One IRGC commander said that the Guards' intervention in politics has been “successful” 
since those who left school to fight at the Iraq-Iran war front can now enter “a new 
                                                 
34 “Iranians: Do They Say They Want a Revolution?,” WorldPublicOpinion.org,  July 19, 2007, 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/379.php?lb=brme&pnt=379&nid=
&id= (accessed May 17, 2010). 
35 “Failed State Index,” ForeignPolicy.com, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/ 06/21/2010 
failed states index interactive mapandrankings (accessed August 4, 2010). 
36 Ali Alfoneh, “How Intertwined are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s Economy?,” 
IranTracker.org, October 22,  2007, http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/how-intertwined-are-
revolutionary-guards-irans-economy (accessed March 5, 2010). 
37 Alfoneh, “How Intertwined are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s Economy?”  
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scene” to preserve the “Islamic nature of the regime.”38 IRGC favoritism has resulted 
from the progression of former IRGC officers into the political system and has allowed 
the IRGC to become a very powerful force both militarily and politically.  The IRGC’s 
strength and influence are demonstrated in its already large and growing role in the 
economy and its success in cracking down on the opposition movement’s protests.  The 
IRGC’s strength and political influence makes it a major factor in the direction of the 
regime.  To hold on to its power, the IRGC will do what it deems necessary to protect its 
existing and growing influence.  The IRGC takes its mandate to protect the revolution 
from internal and external threats very seriously.  The IRGC is a strong pillar for the 
regime because of its vested economic and political interests in seeing the current regime 
remain in place.  The IRGC is, and will remain, loyal to the regime because it has a 
vested interest in preserving the status quo of a strong regime.  A strong regime will 
ensure a strong and influential IRGC, and vice versa.   
In summarizing the political variables of the regime, while the post-election 
protests received widespread attention in the international media, they appear to not have 
significantly altered the public opinion of most Iranians.  The size of the subsequent 
protests in November and December 2009 and February 2010 were smaller than the 
protests immediately following the elections.  This indicates that there was either a 
decline in overt support for the opposition movement, a more effective regime response 
to controlling the movement and its leadership, or a combination of both.  While the 
opposition movement does present some challenge to the current regime, it appears that 
the regime is still politically strong.   
B. MILITARY 
Iranian forces maintain sufficient capabilities and numbers to deter and suppress 
internal threats and a coup d’état.  During the 2009 elections, the regime demonstrated its 
                                                 
38 Ali Alfoneh,”The Revolutionary Guards Role in Iranian Politics,” IranTracker.org, September 1,  
2008, http://www.irantracker.org/military-activities/revolutionary-guards-role-iranian-politics (accessed 
March 5, 2010). 
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willingness to deploy sufficient assets to quell public demonstrations with force and the 
ability to prevent large follow-on demonstrations later in the year and early 2010.   
The Iranian military is comprised of three components: the Islamic Republic of 
Iran Regular Forces, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Basij.  The regular 
forces are estimated at 350,000 strong and are primarily focused on the security of the 
Iranian boarders.39 The IRGC and the Basij are responsible for protecting the regime, 
which makes them a primary instrument for the Supreme Leader to control the internal 
workings of the country and protect the regime from internal threats.  The IRGC and the 
Basij have a central role in the stability of the regime, and their power in the economic 
and political arenas continue to grow.  The IRGC has an estimated strength of 125,000 
and the Basij has an estimated strength of 300,000 with an ability to mobilize 1 million 
registered members.40  While the IRGC and the Iranian Regular Forces provide Iran with 
a sizeable conventional military deterrent against regional opponents or any Gulf 
Cooperation Council alliance, it would not be able to stand up to United States 
conventional forces on the ground, in the air, or in the Persian Gulf due to antiquated 
armor, aircraft, and naval assets that could not stand up to the United States advanced 
military technology.   
The IRGC is also an important element in supporting the Islamist nature of the 
government.  The IRGC was created under a decree from Ayatollah Khomeini for the 
sacred defense of the Islamic Republic and as an ideological guard assisting in the 
implementation of the Islamic Revolution.41  The IRGC uses outreach programs to 
maintain strong support of the Islamic government in the rural areas of Iran.  Some of the 
outreach programs are programs that build and run public works projects, provide job 
training, scholarships, and run summer camps for children—to indoctrinate Islamic 
                                                 
39 “Janes,” Janes.com, December 7, 2009, http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView.do? 
docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2008/jir10416.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keywor
d=basij&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JIR& (accessed March 8,2010)   
40 “Janes,” Janes.com, December 7, 2009, http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView.do? 
docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2008/jir10416.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keywor
d=basij&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JIR& (accessed March 8,2010)   
41 Frederic Wehrey, et al, The Rise of the Pasdaran (Santa Monica, Ca: RAND Corporation, 2009), 
21. 
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principles at an early age.42 The Islamic government accomplishes its indoctrination 
through constant presence, demonstrations of support, and development projects in the 
rural areas.   In a public opinion poll, 83 percent of Iranians had a lot or some confidence 
in the security forces.43   
C. ECONOMY 
Despite the political and military strength of the Iranian regime, the economy is a 
source of weakness and possible vulnerability.  The state-run economy has been on the 
decline since 2000.  Iran’s economy ranks 87th in the world and 6th in the region when 
measured by GDP.44  This position has remained stable over the last three years.  Some 
significant problems include slow growth in GDP, increasing inflation, and high levels of 
unemployment and underemployment.  Though the GDP has continued to rise, its rate of 
growth has dropped from 6 percent to 2 percent in the last three years.45  Eighty percent 
of the Iranian economy is based on earnings from oil and gas exports.46  Inflation in Iran 
has been in double digits for most of the last ten years.  Inflation in Iran was at 25 percent 
in 2008 and exceeded 30 percent in 200947.  This rate of inflation has been five to ten 
times higher than other OPEC countries in the region.48  Reasons for the rise in inflation 
include the government denying banks the ability to charge interest on loans, raiding 
surpluses from oil revenues, gasoline shortages, rapidly rising real estate costs, and 
                                                 
42 Wehrey, The Rise of the Pasdaran, 35. 
43 "An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public,"WorldPublicOpinion.org,  Februaury 3,2010, 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb10/IranElection_Feb10_rpt.pdf (accessed May16, 2010).  
44 “The World Fact Book: Iran,”CIA.gov, January 26, 2010, https://www.cia.gov/ library/ 
publications/ the-world-fact book/geos/ir.html (accessed February 15, 2010). 
45 “The World Fact Book: Iran,”CIA.gov, January 26, 2010, https://www.cia.gov/ library/ 
publications/ the-world-fact book/geos/ir.html (accessed February 15, 2010). 
46 "Iran Country Profile," loc.gov, May 2008,  http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Iran.pdf>. 
(accessed March 2, 2010). 
47 “Inflation, GDP Deflator (Annual%),” UnitedNations.org, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q 
=iran&d=WDI-indicator_ code%3aNY.GDP. DEFL.KD.ZG%3 bcountry _code%3aIRN (accessed March 
8, 2010). 
48 “World Bank Iran,” WorldBank.org, http://ddp-xt.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ View Shared 
Report?&CF =1&REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE =VIEWADVANCED&HF=N&WSP=N  
(accessed March 5, 2010). 
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implementation of price controls.49  Iran continues to suffer from double-digit 
unemployment and underemployment.  Underemployment among Iran's educated youth 
is over 20 percent.   Underemployment has convinced many educated Iranians to seek 
jobs overseas, resulting in a significant loss of intellectual capital 50   
The continued state control of the economy, rising inflation, and massive 
unemployment and underemployment among educated youth are sources of weakness in 
the regime that, over time, could result in greater support to the opposition movement.  
The growing dominance of the IRGC in the economy and the failed efforts of the regime 
to solve inflation and unemployment problems are a source of frustration that the 
opposition movement can utilize to frame its grievances and mobilize supporters. 
D. SOCIAL 
Iran has a very high literacy rate of 79.4 percent and nearly 1.6 million students 
enrolled in university-level institutions.51  The completion of secondary education ranks 
above Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen and is on par with Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, 
and Oman.52 However, the university educational system has not been able to keep up, 
turning away 80 percent of those who take the university entrance exams.53  With a 
growing urban population, a high through-put of students enrolled in university level 
education, and high unemployment and underemployment, this presents a growing area 
of social instability consisting of frustrated and well-educated people.  Iran’s population 
is about 72 million, with two thirds of the population located in urban areas and 
                                                 
49 Michael Rubin,“Irans Economy Runs out of Steam,” IranTracker.org, October 2008, 
http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/irans-economy-runs-out-steam (accessed March 5, 2010). 
50 “The World Fact Book: Iran,”CIA.gov, January 26, 2010, https://www.cia.gov/ library/ 
publications/ the-world-fact book/geos/ir.html (accessed February 15, 2010). 
51 “TheFundForPeace,”FundForPeace.org, 2008, http://www.fundforpeace.org/web 
/index.php?option = comcontent&task=view&id=397&Itemid=556 (accessed March 4, 2010). 
52 “Iran-Islamic-Republic,” World Bank.org, 2010, http://data.worldbank.org/country/iran-islamic-
republic (accessed July 28, 2010). 
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continuing to grow at a rate of 2.1 percent.54  As well, 18 percent of the Iranian 
population lives below the poverty level.55  Iran received a Human Development Index 
rating 0.782 on a scale of 0-1.  This rating stands as 88th in the world out of 182 rated 
countries; however, Iran is well above the average for all the Middle Eastern states.56  
E. INFRASTRUCTURE 
 Iran has a strong transportation, food distribution, domestic services and a rapidly 
growing telecommunications infrastructure.  The only major weakness is their ability to 
produce gasoline domestically, but foreign investment and current infrastructure projects 
are in progress in order to close this gap. In the last ten years the telecommunications 
system infrastructure projects have greatly increased mobile phone and Internet access.  
Between 2001 and 2008, the amount of available telephone lines nearly doubled to 24 
million, and cellular telephone service has tripled to over 30 million subscribers.57  
Internet access has risen from 1 million in 2001 to 21 million in 2007.58 Nearly one third 
of Iranians have Internet access, mobile phones, or both.  The Iranian’s access to mobile 
phone services and Internet ranks in the top 30 nations in the world.59   
The CIA World Fact Book has the Iranian road, rail, and airport infrastructure 
ranked in the top 30 nations in the world, and gives high ratings to its waterways and 
merchant marine capabilities.60  According to the world food program, Iran has a low 
Global Hunger Index rating, thus indicating that the population has good access to food 
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supplies and clean water.  Issues of hunger and malnutrition are also very low.61  Ninety-
four percent of Iranians have reliable access to clean water, which is higher than the 
Middle East average of 87.7 percent.62  
F. INFORMATION 
 The regime’s censorship of external information sources and social networking 
sites indicates that the regime is concerned that these platforms will lead to greater 
dissent against the regime.  The regime wants to restrict the exposure of its people to 
Western social and political influences.  The regime fears that exposure to Western 
influences could lead to social corruption and increased moral and political challenges to 
the regime’s legitimacy. 
The Iranian regime has established an extensive media apparatus (print, TV, 
radio, and Internet) that allows it to spread its vision of the Islamic Republic.  However, 
Iran limits freedom of press in its media apparatuses.  Freedom of the press in Iran has 
continued to decline between 2002 and 2009 and Iran has never been given a rating of 
less than “Not Free.”63  Following the June 2009 elections, Iranians were able to send out 
some pictures and video of the regime’s violent crackdown against the protesters.  
However, the regime quickly took measures to control media access.  Not long after the 
initial protests, in order to monitor e-mail traffic, the regime announced the creation of a 
national e-mail service.   They limited the ability of journalists to see the later protests 
and they did a much more effective job at denying cell phone and Internet service during 
the protests.64  The disruptions of services during and after the protests, according to the 
Communications Ministry, were due to damaged fiber optic lines and planned software 
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updates to the cellular phone network.65  Despite these disruptions and Iran’s pervasive 
filtering and surveillance of Internet and mobile phone services, information still got out 
to a regional and international audience.  Access to Internet and cell phone services is 
expanding, and Iranians that support the opposition movement are becoming more 
innovative in getting around state controls to media access.   It will be increasingly 
difficult for the regime to control access to media and to control information flow 
between opposition movement supporters.  However, the regime is determined to limit 
opposition movement communication and organization by controlling and censoring 
information mediums such as the Internet and mobile phone usage.   
G. RANKING THE REGIME USING PMESII 
Figure 5 summarizes the findings of each of the PMESII articles and their 
variables.  Our rating of each variable reflects our attempt to quantify the strengths and 
weaknesses of the regime.  The rating reflects a weighing of the facts that were related to 
each variable.  The variable ratings in Table 1 are subjective.       
Overall the regime received a score of 3.18 on a scale of 1 to 5.  This indicates 
that the regime remains strong and stable, but not so strong that important aspects of the 
regime are not invulnerable to exploitation.   
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Figure 5.  Methodology Flow Diagram 
 
The sources of weaknesses for the regime are in its mismanagement of the 
economy, its censorship of communications, repression of civil liberties, and its standing 
in committing human rights violations.  These are facets of the regime that could be 
exploited to weaken the overall strength of the regime.   If exploited properly, growing 
tensions over these issues could cause growing fissures in the regime.  Large fissures 
could cause the regime to weaken to the point that it would succumb to pressures for 
reform.  
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III.  ANALYZING THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF 
THE OPPOSITION MOVEMENT USING SMT 
This chapter looks at the strengths and weaknesses of the major opposition 
movement in Iran, the Green Movement, and analyzes the movement using Social 
Movement Theory (SMT).  Based on the application of the SMT model laid out by Doug 
McAdam to the Green Movement, it was determined that the Green Movement contains 
enough attributes to be considered a social movement.  With this identification, the Green 
Movement can be viewed as a significant threat to the Iranian regime.   
There are many organizations that oppose the current Iranian government.  Some 
are militant and violent while others are not.  Armed political groups, such as the 
Mujahadeen-e Khalq (MEK), do not pose a significant threat to the regime itself.  They 
have not shown the ability to organize or develop into a threat capable of forcing Iranian 
political elites to submit to the armed group’s demands, or even recognize their 
grievances.  Although armed political groups may be useful to those who support Iranian 
regime reform by providing additional external pressure on Iranian political figures and 
providing information to anti-regime allies about regime activities, this chapter focuses 
on the Green Movement because the Green Movement is the one opposition group in Iran 
that calls for reform through nonviolent activism. 
Nonviolent activism poses the biggest threat to the Iranian regime.  Nonviolent 
activism increases the credibility of the movement, domestically and within the 
international community, and does not give regime justification for violent crackdown.  
The “Green Movement” was born when older nonviolent opposition movements in Iran 
consolidated and re-branded themselves immediately following the June 12, 2009, 
Iranian presidential election.  Abdolkarim Soroush, scholar, reform-movement founder, 
and manifesto signatory, articulates the evolution of the Green Movement: “And now we 
have the Green Movement, which is a culmination of the (pre-June 12, 2009, presidential 
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election) reform movement, a new stage.”66 From here onward in this thesis, the 
opposition movement will be what is referred to as the Green Movement.   
The biggest question with reference to whether there will be imminent Iranian 
regime reform is, “How strong is the Green Movement?”  An analysis of the Green 
Movement’s strengths and weaknesses can assist policy makers in determining if the 
movement will succeed on its own, as well as determining if intervention in aspects of 
where the Green Movement is weak would help in its goal of regime reform.  The first 
step in is to determine how strong the Green Movement is now. 
Turmoil erupted in Iran immediately following the June 12, 2009, presidential 
election.  Protests with estimates of as many as three million demonstrators turned out in 
the streets to voice their dissatisfaction with the current regime and the perceived 
fraudulent election results.67 Many Iranian citizens believed the election of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad to his second term in office was an outrage.  During Ahmadinejad’s first 
term, Iran’s economic condition declined, unemployment increased, and the repression of 
civil liberties such as freedoms of speech and assembly continued.  In addition, many 
Iranian citizens were questioning the absolute authority of the Supreme Leader.  The 
three months following the presidential election demonstrated to the regime and the 
people of Iran that a significant number of Iranian citizens were willing to take to the 
streets and demand major changes in the Iranian government.  However, starting in early 
2010, the number and size of demonstrations have waned.   
In the months following the 2009 election, there seemed to be a real chance for 
the Green Movement to affect regime reform.  Now, commentators tend to think 
otherwise.  Fareed Zakaria, a columnist for Newsweek, wrote: “I do not think that it [the 
Green Movement] is likely to overthrow the Iranian regime.  To believe that, one has to 
believe the government in Tehran is deeply unpopular with a majority of Iranians, holds 
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onto power through military force alone, and is thus vulnerable to a movement that could 
mobilize the vast majority in Iran who despise it.  None of this is entirely true.”68  
However, the Green Movement has not gone away and still commands significant 
numbers of supporters.  Social Movement Theory may be a way to determine if the Green 
Movement still has a chance to affect change. 
A. ANALYSIS USING SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
 Social Movement Theory is a method of analysis and understood format in which 
the Green Movement’s strengths and weaknesses can be understood in relation to other 
social movements.  Social Movement Theory provides for a comprehensive, 
interconnected understanding by producing a set of shared working questions, concepts, 
and lines of theory.69 Social movements occur when “under authoritarian rule, the masses 
lack formal political access to mitigate the adverse effects of . . . the deterioration of 
quality of life.”70 Three broad sets of factors outlined by Doug McAdam, John D. 
McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald are used in the analysis of the Green Movement.  These 
factors are: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes.71 Also, 
the grievances—the strains that produced collective action—of the Green Movement are 
identified and discussed in order to relate why many Iranian citizens took to the streets in 
protest to demand reform of the Iranian government.   
B. GRIEVANCES 
 The Green Movement’s list of grievances demands greater civil liberties, political 
reform through new constitutional amendments, and even the condemnation of the 
Supreme Leader.   
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 The perceived fraudulent and illegitimate presidential election of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in June 2009 was the flashpoint that ignited the brewing unrest of millions 
of people toward the Iranian regime.  Millions of Iranians realized their “shared collective 
rage” over the election outcome, but more so, they also realized they “shared collective 
values and vision” for a change in their government.72 Initially, protesters contested the 
election, but as weeks passed after the election, they then started challenging the 
fundamental structure of the Islamic Republic.73 The issues evolved to include demands 
for political change and condemnation of the Supreme Leader.74 Political change meant 
not only a change in Iran’s conservative government and religious heads, but also more 
civil liberties that Iranian citizens believed should be their basic freedoms.  Demands 
included “elimination of non-elected oversight councils, freedom of speech and press, 
minority rights, release of political prisoners and dismantling of the police state.”75 
Iranians were protesting authoritarian rule, state repression, and structural strains that 
were preventing them from having the quality of life they felt they deserved. 
 The Green Movement articulated their grievances and demands when they 
published their first manifesto in January 2010.  The manifesto called for the “recognition 
of law-abiding political, student, non-governmental and women’s groups; labor unions; 
freedom for all means of mass communication; an independent judiciary, including 
popular election of the judicial chief.”76 It had other specific demands as well—ten in 
all—including banning security forces from intervening in politics and the economy, 
calling for the resignation of Ahmadinejad, and freeing all political prisoners.77 The 
second manifesto, published in June 2010, additionally called for stripping Ayatollah 
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Khamenei of his position as Supreme Leader because of his “unfairness.”78 The specific 
demands in the first manifesto were worded in more general terms in the second 
manifesto.  It called for the “implementation of new constitutional amendments” 
indicated that the unofficial leaders of the Green Movement were not seeking regime 
change, but regime reform.  Reform could be accomplished using the existing framework 
of the Iranian constitution, and laws could be “amended according to different 
circumstances as well as national and public interests.”79 Mehdi Karrubi, an unofficial 
leader of the Green Movement, member of the Expediency Discernment Council, and 
former chairman of the Iranian parliament, recently stated: “We’re saying that the regime 
must return to its main path.  Fair and free elections must be held.  Independent press 
must be shaped and they must have freedom of speech.  Parties and fractions must have a 
right to be active, trade unions and difference [sic] sectors of the people must be 
recognized and their rights respected, and the constitution must fully be implemented.”80  
 One of the most significant points of the Green Movement’s manifesto is the 
demand to strip Ayatollah Khamenei of his position.  His leadership is viewed by the 
opposition as “ruthless, unjust, and contrary to Islam, democracy, and human rights.”81 
Khamenei’s authoritarian rule has been a rallying point for the opposition to gain support.  
Collective outcry against his leadership has helped the opposition attract support in those 
parts of Iranian society that have seemed silent.82 Khamenei’s religious authority has also 
been put into question.  “Khamenei’s claims to religious authority have never been 
widely accepted by either the senior clergy or the pious public.”83 But Khamenei firmly 
views his authority as just, and he views the Green Movement as a threat to his rule.  He 
                                                 
78 Ardeshir Arian, “The Seven-Point Manifesto of the Iranian Resistance,” pajamasmedia.com, June 
16, 2010, http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/the-seven-point-manifesto-of-the-iranian-resistance/  (accessed 
June 17, 2010). 
79 “Karroubi: Islamic Republic has Derailed from its Path,” en.irangreenvoice.com, May 17, 2010, 
http://en.irangreenvoice.com/article/2010/may/17/1895  (accessed May 20, 2010). 
80 “Karroubi: Islamic Republic has Derailed from its Path,” en.irangreenvoice.com, May 17, 2010, 
http://en.irangreenvoice.com/article/2010/may/17/1895  (accessed May 20, 2010). 
81 Mehdi Khalaji, “One Year after a Rigged Election: Iran’s Introverted Politics,” The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch #1667 (June 9, 2010): 1. 
82 Khalaji, “One Year after a Rigged Election: Iran’s Introverted Politics,” 3. 
83 Clawson, “Much Traction from Measured Steps,” 7. 
 32
views the Green Movement as an extension of the West’s “soft war” against the Islamic 
Republic and therefore connected to Western governments and intelligence agencies.84 
He believes that the regime is entitled to crack down with all means at their disposal “as 
long as they [Green Movement activists] pursue subversive goals.”85 In his battle to crush 
any reform-minded thinkers, Khamenei has cracked down even on former colleagues and 
important political figures, jailed the heads of two prominent reformist groups, deprived 
reformists of any kind of media platform, and made it illegal to quote [Mir-Hossein] 
Mousavi or [Mehdi] Karrubi in the press.86 
C. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
 The conditions for the rise and growth of social movement contention in regard to 
the Green Movement were analyzed to determine if conditions exist in suitable strength 
for the movement to effect change in the Iranian regime.   
 Political opportunity structures emerge when there are “changes in the 
institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political system.”87 
Power relations in Iran’s political system have changed dramatically since the June 2009 
elections.  The presidential election was contested, there was the call for the removal of 
Iran’s highest official, and there is evidence of broadening division in Iran’s political 
elites.  Besides instability of elite alignments, conditions for the rise and growth of social 
movement contention are: the availability of allies, nature of state repression, and the 
institutional strength of the state.88 
 An important factor in the emergence of any social movement is if citizens have 
substantive access to formal and informal policymaking channels.  Citizens may seek 
other avenues for change if they lack access to policymaking channels.  Public outcry is 
one means citizens call for changes in their government.  When the outcry is loud 
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enough, sustained, and heard by millions of citizens, a social movement can be born.  
However, the movement needs political elites who will side with the public’s discourse in 
order to gain enough traction to affect real change.  Alliances of political elites in favor of 
the opposition can unify the cause under a common banner to reform the current system.  
As well, the instability of elite alliances of those who oppose reform will also help the 
movement by causing disunity and stagnation in their quest to stymie the opposition 
movement.  In Iran, to a degree, there is both elite alliances and elite division.   
 Divisions within the ruling elite are increasingly apparent today.89 Infighting “has 
grown more intense and complex,” which has resulted in the regime’s inability to come 
to a consensus on many issues, effectively making the regime ineffectual.90  One 
indicator of the gradually widening fissures in the regime’s power base is the divergence 
in conservative responses to recent events.91  “A deep rift has emerged within it [the 
Iranian regime] since June 12 [2009], foreshadowed by the continuous rightward shift in 
Iranian politics over the past four years.”92 The quibbling over issues and emergence of 
tension is occurring “at the highest levels of Iran’s power structure.”93 Examples of this 
are when Deputy Majlis speaker Muhammad Reza Bahonar accused Ahmadinejad of 
“purposefully” violating the law [concerning economic issues].94 Others, such as Ahmad 
Jannati, the powerful Guardian Council secretary, stated, “post-election turmoil prevented 
us from criticizing Ahmadinejad’s government, but it does not mean we are without 
criticism. . . How long must we keep silent?”95 Ahmadinejad appears to lack a solid 
power base within the elite.96 Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, does not support 
Ahmadinejad on many issues, but many members are not bold enough to speak out 
                                                 
89 Khalaji, “One Year after a Rigged Election,” 2. 
90 Clawson, “Much Traction from Measured Steps,” 1. 
91 Brianna Rosen, “The Trials Continue: Defection Not an Option,” irantracker.org, August 14, 2009, 
http://irantracker.org/full-publication/trials-continue-defection-not-option  (accessed December 10, 2009). 
92 David Cvach, “How to Assess Political Fissures in Iran,” washingtoninstitue.org, February 10, 
2010, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3173  (accessed February 10, 2010). 
93 Rosen, “The Trials Continue.” 
94 Khalaji, “One Year after a Rigged Election,”2. 
95 Khalaji, “One Year after a Rigged Election,”2. 
96 Khalaji, “One Year after a Rigged Election,”2. 
 34
directly against him in fear of going against the Supreme Leader.  “Were it not for 
Khamenei’s backing, the Majlis could have opposed the president much more easily.”97 
 However, the claims of instability of elite alliances are contested.  Ali Larijani, 
the speaker of Iran’s parliament, rejected the claims of “divisions” within the regime, 
blaming foreigners for attempting to “sow discord.”98 And, many Middle East analysts 
report that “there is no significant elite challenge to the current political structure.”99 In 
addition, there have been no “substantial defections” from members of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps or Basij.100 So, are there elite divisions?  The answer is yes, 
but few.  Elites desire to hold on to power and they have much to lose by openly being 
reform-minded, or in the least, sympathetic to the idea of any form of change.  It is safer 
for them to side with the regime, which is still strong and firmly in place.   
 However, it may only take a small fissure to crack the establishment wide open.  
The Green Movement’s unofficial leaders, Mousavi and Karrubi, are highly respected 
elites with millions of supporters on the streets and sympathizers in Iran’s government. 
They have access to institutional politics through their political connections and 
colleagues.  Allies in the Iranian government may be waiting for the right opportunity to 
show their support.  It is likely that once quiet regime elites will speak out in support of 
reform measures if the Green Movement is able to regain significant traction.   
 Other allies may include reformist clerics.  Two prominent clerics that have been 
linked to reformist thought are Hashemi Rafsanjani, Chairman of the Assembly of 
Experts and former president and Chairman of Iranian parliament, and Hassan Rowhani, 
member of the Supreme National Security Council and member of the Expediency 
Discernment Council and former Deputy Speaker of Majlis.101 However, “the vast 
majority [of clerics] are politically docile, distancing themselves from such issues [that 
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are critical of the regime].”102 Those who have spoken out against the regime, such as 
Ayatollahs Ali Hossein Montazeri and Yousef Sanei, had their offices shut down.103 
Ayatollah Ali Montazeri was the only cleric to boldly criticize the hardliners; however, 
he died in December, 2009.104 The bottom line is that much of the clergy remains “silent 
on the sidelines.”105  
 State repression is another condition that allows for political opportunity.  
Socioeconomic issues, lack of civil liberties, and humans rights violations are forms of 
state repression.  However, in the context of the Green Movement, state repression issues 
are better thought of as ways the movement members collectively share the same 
grievances; and thus, how they frame the reasons why they protest the regime.  These 
issues will be discussed in detail under Mobilizing Structures.   
 The institutional strength of the state is strong.  The regime’s authoritarian rule 
over its citizens is a main cause for protest.  Many Iranians desire a less oppressive and 
obtrusive government.  However, because the institutional strength of the state is strong 
(detailed in Chapter II), the state does not provide for any political opportunities for the 
Green Movement.   
 Another potential political opportunity for the Green Movement is the schism in 
the country over Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  Only 38 percent of Iranians support 
both nuclear power and nuclear weapons.106 And, in the eyes of many Iranians, “anything 
associated with Ahmadinejad is now unpopular, and that applies to the nuclear weapons 
program.”107 The nuclear weapons issue could be an opportunity for political elites to 
pick sides.  However, the Green Movement has chosen to remain silent on the nuclear 
impasse, and any other foreign policy issue, in order to not lose any of its support base.  
The impasse “muddies the waters; the opposition is better served by concentrating on 
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domestic concerns.”108  “It is quite conceivable . . . that opposition leaders would take the 
more modest step on remaining silent on the issue.”109  
 There are other political opportunities for the Green Movement that do not exist 
yet, but may exist in the future.  The death of either President Amadinejad or Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khanenei would result in a political void that could be filled by a more 
reform-minded leader.  Another political opportunity is during the next presidential 
election in 2013.  If a reform-minded president were elected, he would likely fill key 
government positions with like-minded people that would be willing to amend the Iranian 
constitution and enact laws to ensure more freedoms for the Iranian people.   In the 
meantime, the Green movement is, and should continue, working on increasing the public 
stature of reform-minded leaders.  Increasing the stature of reform-minded leaders gives 
the ideology of the Green movement more credence, and as well, could help influence 
who the Guardian Council will allow to run as a candidate in 2013 presidential election.   
D. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
 This section analyzes the many forms of mobilizing structures used by the Green 
Movement.  Material, moral, human, cultural, and socio-organizational mobilizing 
structures all exist within the Green Movement and prove that the Green Movement has a 
wide array of means to support its cause. 
 Mobilizing structures are “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, 
through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.”110 Examples of formal 
vehicles for mobilization are: the mosque, non-government organizations, professional 
and student organizations, and political parties.  Informal vehicles for mobilization could 
be informal urban networks or other social networks.  Social networks and informal 
resources for mobilization are especially common in less open societies where visibility 
is dangerous.111 This is the case with the Green Movement in Iran.  There are no formal 
organizations that formally resource the Green Movement.  If any had briefly existed, 
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they were likely shut down immediately by the regime.  The Green Movement, instead, 
relies heavily on informal vehicles to keep the movement alive and organize protests.  
Various social movement communities are the mobilizing structures that are used to carry 
out the necessary functions of the movement.  These functions include the ability to 
“recruit like-minded individuals, socialize new participants, overcome the free rider 
problem, and mobilize contention.”112  
 Social movement communities are often born when “opportunity spaces” exist.  
Opportunity spaces are “fora of social interaction that create new opportunities for 
augmenting networks of shard meaning and associated life.”113 They create the 
possibility for the entrance and enhancement of new movement voices, perspectives, and 
projects.114 Opportunity spaces can exist in private homes, school classrooms, at a 
protest, or in a break room at work.  For the Green Movement, the opportunity space for 
political fora exists when debate on reformist issues occurs in parliament or during a 
protest.  Electronic media cyberspace is another arena used by both Green movement 
activists and those still seeking information about the movement.  The marketplace is an 
opportunity space arena where the bazaaris come together and discuss political issues that 
affect their lives.  Each of these opportunity spaces provides an opportunity for the Green 
Movement to recruit like-minded individuals, socialize new participants, overcome the 
free rider problem, and mobilize contention.  It is in these places that the Green 
Movement was born and stays alive.  These informal locations allow the movement to 
exist spontaneously and everywhere, making it nearly impossible for the Iranian regime 
to crush the movement with a single blow.   
 Mobilizing structures is just another way of describing resources that can enable 
and assist a social movement to prosper.  Scholars suggest that there are five types of 
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resources.115 The first is material.  Material is money and physical capital, of which the 
Green Movement has none.  The material of the Green Movement comes from each of 
the protesters in the form of banners, posters, graffiti, and green cloth.  Because of the 
advent and popularity of cyberspace, many resources that before would cost money, such 
as flyers and television ads, are no longer needed.  The Green Movement has technical 
and digital capabilities that give it mechanisms to connect its members and mobilize 
them.116 Cell phone texts, Internet blogs, and e-mails are all are needed to effectively 
distribute the movement’s messages.   
 The second type of mobilizing structure resource is moral.  The Green Movement 
appeals to a broad swath of society because it calls for less government oppression and 
civil liberties.  These are ideas that resonate as basic freedoms that every person deserves.  
However, there is a lack of solidarity in Iran in the desire for these aims.  Many citizens 
in Iran still support the regime or choose to remain politically silent.  This reaction may 
be out of fear or out of devotion to the Islamic Republic’s pious foundation.  Also, many 
Iranians may not support all of the movement’s goals.  For example, they may agree with 
freedom of speech and women’s rights, but not agree with the removal of the president or 
Supreme Leader from office.   
 The third type of mobilizing structure resource is human.  The human resource 
refers to the volunteers, staff, and leaders of the movement.117 While volunteers and staff 
indicate that there are formal mobilizing structures, there is no evidence of “official” 
leaders or a formal institution supporting the Green Movement.  However, this could be 
the most important and beneficial aspect of the Green Movement’s structure.  “There’s no 
head to decapitate, no way for the movement to be silenced in one catastrophic loss.”118 
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The decentralized leadership of the movement means that anyone can spearhead the 
cause, allowing for diverse and creative ways of fighting for its goal.119 Potentially, there 
is a pool of thousands to lead the battle for regime reform.  “The true ‘leaders’ of the 
Green Movement are anonymous people who create, print, and distribute the posters that 
coordinate the demonstrations.”120 However, three politically connected leaders with 
impressive credentials emerged as unofficial leaders of the Green Movement.  Mir-
Hossein Mousavi credentials include being a member of the Expediency Discernment 
Council, the former Prime Minister of Iran, and 2009 presidential candidate.   Mehdi 
Karrubi credentials include being the former chairman of the Iranian parliament, a 
member of the Expediency Discernment Council, and a 2009 presidential candidate.  
Mohammad Khatami was the former president Iran, Minister of Culture, and 2009 
presidential candidate.121 Recently, only Mousavi and Karrubi are named the unofficial 
leaders of the Green Movement, and Khatami remains a vocal supporter of regime 
reform.  These prominent and respected Iranian leaders give credence to the demands of 
the Green Movement as well as institutional access.  Mousavi and Karrubi are mobilizing 
forces themselves because the Iranian citizens who supported them during their 
campaigns for president were mobilized to support them when they became leaders in the 
Green Movement.   
The fourth type of mobilizing structure resource is cultural.  Cultural resources 
refer to such things as prior activist experience, collective action know-how, and 
understanding the issues.122 There is no lack of accessibility to information about the 
issues because of the ease of distribution of information through cyberspace, that is, at 
least for those who have access to cyberspace.  Access to cyberspace may be a major 
reason why the Green Movement is a movement of the urban middle class.  The poor and 
those living in rural areas are likely to not have the same access to cyber media, thus, not 
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allowing them anonymous communication and information gathering about the Green 
Movement’s agenda and goals.  The poor and rural population in Iran must partake in 
much riskier face-to-face communication where the risk of loss of anonymity may not be 
worth the effort.  The exact extent of Green Movement support from rural areas and the 
lower class is not known.  There is not a “clear picture of the full extent of the movement 
and its penetration in the various urban and rural classes and traditional leadership.”123 
The Green Movement may be able to broaden their support base if the movement can 
figure out a way to more effectively communicate with these groups of society.  Satellite 
television ads could be one medium, if only the Green Movement had the funding and 
they could get around the regime’s censors.   When it comes to issues of activist 
experience and collective action know-how, only a very small minority of the 
movement’s supporters have any.  The two unofficial leaders of the Green Movement, 
Mousavi and Karrubi, witnessed collective action during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but 
the vast majority of current movement supporters are Iran’s youth who do not remember 
or were not alive in 1979. 
 Socio-organizational resources help in the mobilization of a movement.  These 
resources, comprising of social networks that enable recruitment and allow for 
organizations to strategize the dissemination of their messages, are prevalent in the social 
networks of Iran’s students and youth.  All statistics in this paragraph are taken from Tara 
Nesvanderani’s article on Iranian youth.124  Iran’s youth, as defined between the ages of 
15 and 29, account for 35 percent of Iran’s total population and they constitute nearly 40 
percent of the electorate.  “Iran has the most politically active youth among the 57 nations 
of the Islamic world.”  Because of their political activism, Iran’s youth are extremely 
important in defining Iran’s political, economic, and social agenda.  The youth are one of 
the two main agents of change, along with women, now challenging the rigid Islamic 
rule.  A large number of Green Movement members are students.  They have rallied en 
mass to call for regime reform because the regime “has failed to address the basic 
socioeconomic problems among youth.”  The regime has been ineffective in addressing 
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their basic needs.  Iran has a chronic job shortage.  The government is able to generate 
only 300, 000 of the more than one million jobs needed annually to absorb young people 
joining entering the labor market.  The educational system has not been able to keep up, 
turning away 80 percent of those to take the university entrance exams.  Even with a 
university degree, it takes an average of three years to find a job.  Youth account for 80 
percent of the unemployed.  Only one in four males is able to find a job, and only one in 
two females.  And, there is a large housing shortage.  These issues apply to other Iranians 
as well.  Another reason for the discontent among Iran’s youth is that they are better 
educated and more worldly than any previous generation.  “Most are regularly exposed to 
global media, ideas and culture through satellite television and Internet.  Iran boasts 
60,000 to 110,000 active blogs.  Most young Iranians are believed to want to be part of 
the international community and globalization.  They see that the current government is 
not providing what other nations’ governments are providing their citizens.   
 Iran’s youth are resilient in calling for reform despite crackdowns by the 
regime and harsh punishments of those who are arrested.   “Despite the crackdowns that 
stopped all major protests, students kept the opposition movement alive in smaller 
protests at universities in Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, Mazandran, and Kurdistan.”125 There 
were mass arrests, expulsion and sentencing of students to long prison terms for 
“violating national security and promoting propaganda against the regime.”126  
 The youth are also responsible for many of the social networks that keep 
the Green Movement alive.  As a mobilizing force, social networks are the “most viable 
means of building movements within the current political environment.  They are also 
important transmission belts of collective identity, drawing the ideas, sensibilities, and 
reflexivity of the people together while criss-crossing social, economic and political 
hierarchies.”127 In such, there are several youth organizations that are aligned with the 
same ideologies as the Green Movement.  The Office for Consolidating Unity is Iran’s 
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largest student movement has the agenda of individual rights under Islamic rule.  This 
student organization was the forefront of the Green Movement protests calling people to 
the streets through social networks.128 Students for Freedom and Equality campaign 
against military and intelligence agents on campuses.  United Student Front is a radical 
secular group that is opposed to the nonsecular Islamic Republic.  Iran also has dozens of 
political parties and youth wings.  Major reform parties include the Islamic Iran 
Participation Front, Islamic Revolution Mujahadin, the National Trust Party, the Freedom 
Movement of Iran, and The Youth Party of Iran.129   
Other organized networks that act as a conduit and mobilizing force for reformist 
thought are civil societies in Iran.  The One Million Signature Campaign aims to alter 
discriminatory laws on women and children, the Committee of Human Rights Reporters 
documents human rights violations, and the Committee for Defense of Political Prisoners 
is an advocate prisoner rights.130  
One other potential mobilizing vehicle for the Green Movement is in the 
defections and divisions within Iran’s political elites.  As of yet, elite defection has not 
occurred to any significant extent.  But, divisions within the elite “are obvious in what 
some leaders say and in what other leaders are not allowed to say.”131 Perceived or not, 
internal divisions threaten the foundation of the regime because the idea preoccupies the 
regime leaders, thus taking away their ability to build strong alliances that would 
strengthen the regime and its motives.  As well, elite divisions can indicate regime 
weaknesses and can then mobilize reformist-minded citizens to take advantage of the 
perceived weakness.  If elite divisions appear significant, it could sway those citizens 
who, in the past, remained silent to finally vocally join the side of the reformers.  Because 
elite divisions can widen the fissures between political elites resulting in lines being 
drawn and sides being taken, elite defections can be viewed as political opportunity as 
much as a potential mobilizing force.  So far, the regime seems to be able to hold on to its 
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strength.  There are indicators of division among political figures, but the very powerful 
IRGC remains strong.  “Although the IRGC has seen its legitimacy corroded, it has not 
become weakened.”132 And, reports indicate that an IRGC coup is unlikely.133  
E. FRAMING PROCESSES 
The Green Movement has been successful in framing its messages in a way that 
resonates with a large percentage of Iranians.  The Green Movement has accomplished 
this by having an ideology with a broad appeal, distinguishing characteristics from other 
political movements, and powerful symbols. 
Framing processes allow “individual participants conceptualize themselves as a 
collectivity; how potential participants are actually convinced to participate; and the ways 
in which meaning is produced, articulated and disseminated.”134 Frames make sense of 
experiences.135 Proper framing of an issue can “elicit participation as a response to a 
perceived moral duty of obligation.”136 To be successful in eliciting high levels of 
participation, the movement must be able to provide clear summations of its ideology that 
resonate with its target audience.  Proper framing resonates in a way that provides 
“language that captures or constricts the meaning of problems.”137 Using recognized 
rhetoric and symbols are two ways for the movement to identify itself easily and 
distinctly.  Another necessary attribute of the messages is that they need to be framed in 
simple language that offers a “bumper-sticker version of its broader ideology.”138 
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Focusing on its positive attributes, the Green Movement has done well in framing its 
message. 
The Green Movement has many attributes for success.  The challenge for the 
movement is to frame those attributes in a manner that resonates with enough citizens so 
that the movement has overwhelming support.  The first attribute that the Green 
Movement has is the sheer numbers of Iranians that want a say in the future of Iran.  
Forty million turned out at the polls for the June 12, 2009, elections, and three million 
protested the election results on June 15, 2009.139 Second, the Green Movement has 
“breadth, depth, and weight.”140 The movement encompasses a large swath of society, 
notably across classes and ethnicities.  It also “boasts the backing of public intellectuals 
and artists, students, and some top clerics.”141 Having the support of influential top 
clerics allows for a source of mobilization in an Islamic-based society.  The movement 
also extends to the diaspora.  Third, the decentralized leadership of the movement means 
that anyone can spearhead the cause, allowing for diverse and creative ways of fighting 
for its goal.142 However, decentralized leadership can be a source of weakness because it 
allows divergent efforts and messages.  Fourth, the movement has potent symbols.  Two 
of the most recognized symbols of the Green Movement are the color green and the “V” 
sign.  Finally, the movement is “civil, peaceful, and secular.”  The Green Movement 
promotes nonviolent protest, strives for civil rights, and rejects political Islam.143 
The Green Movement has characteristics that distinguish it from other political 
movements.  The non-ideological nature of the Green Movement keeps it from bearing 
any direct relation to other ideologies, such as anti-imperialism, nationalism, Islamism, or 
socialism.144 The youth and urban middle classes are the principle social base of the 
movement.  The youth, particularly the university students—3.5 million young Iranians 
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currently enrolled in universities and other institutions of higher learning—play a key 
role in the movement.145 Spontaneity allows the movement to respond to changing 
conditions and opportunities, and the use of modern tools of communication, such as cell 
phones, Facebook, Twitter, etc., “greatly facilitated to spread the news, the protesters' 
ability to communicate among themselves and with the outside world, and thus 
significantly increased the reach and impact of the movement.”146 One of the main 
reasons for the Green Movement’s success is that it has adopted a nonviolent strategy as 
a framing mechanism. If the Green Movement chose to use violence, it “would give the 
regime the excuse to justify its repressive measures.”147 The pluralist nature, too, allows 
the movement to be inclusive “both in relation to different groups inside Iran and to the 
politically active Iranian diaspora.”148 The pluralist nature also allows the movement to 
restrict monopolistic ideological tendencies enabling it to remain appealing to a wide 
breadth of Iranian citizens.  The movement’s distinctive demands for free and honest 
elections and respect for human and civil rights “has been hailed the world over.”149  And 
finally, the Green Movement’s main aim—its emphasis on freedom and democracy—is 
“the most politically advantageous feature of the Green Movement” because of its broad 
appeal.150   
 The Green Movement has been relatively successful in encapsulating its 
distinctive characteristics and positive attributes using powerful forms of symbolism that 
have resonated with millions of supporters.  The movement has adopted recognized 
rhetoric and symbols to identify it easily and distinctly and offer a clear summation of its 
ideology.  Protesters publicly denounced the regime’s legitimacy at the highest levels of 
leadership chanting the slogan “Where’s my vote?” following the perceived fraudulent 
election of Ahmadinejad.  As the initial rallying cry of the Green Movement, this slogan 
resonated deeply with millions of protesters.  Since the initial protests, newer slogans 
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such as “Khamenei is a murderer, his leadership is illegitimate!” and “Independence, 
Freedom, Iranian Republic!” have become some of the rallying cries for change in the 
Iranian regime.151  
 Another distinctive symbol of the Green movement is the color green.  Protesters 
often wear green garments and use green paint on banners and posters.  There are several 
possible reasons why the color green became the color of the movement.  It is also the 
color of the reformist presidential candidate Mousavi’s political party, the National Trust 
Party.  The color green is associated with Islam because the Quran says that the 
inhabitants of paradise will wear green garments of fine silk.  Color theorists suggest that 
green represents life and renewal.  It also is considered a restful color bringing feelings of 
balance, harmony, and stability—all attributes that the Green Movement wants to 
represent.152 The Green Movement’s ideology is conceptualized readily with the color 
green.  
 In one instance, a single event became a symbol of the Green Movement’s 
struggle against a ruthless and authoritarian regime.  That instance was the death of Neda 
Agha-Soltan, a young Iranian philosophy student who was killed during protests on June 
2, 2009.  Neda’s death “generated much anger, which strengthened the opposition.”153   
 Green Movement leaders, namely Mousavi and Karrubi, have repeatedly framed 
the Green Movement as a reform movement.   It is a reform movement not only because 
it pursues the civil demands of broad sections of the population, but also because it seeks 
changes in the regime, not revolution for regime change.  Mousavi advocates 
compromise with the Iranian regime to reach a middle line.  Mousavi “maintains that the 
constitution holds great potential and must be revived.”154 He has been pressing his 
supporters to remain within the confines of the constitution of the Islamic Republic.  
Mousavi stated, “’We demand the unconditional enactment of the constitution and return 
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of the Islamic Republic to its original ethical foundations.  We demand an Islamic 
Republic, not a word more, not a word less.’  Meanwhile, protesters were calling for the 
creation of an Iranian Republic to replace the Islamic Republic.”155 This position by the 
leaders of the Green Movement divides it with respect to its ultimate aims.  “Mousavi, 
Khatami, Rafsanjani and others appear to want a more transparent and humane rule 
[with] a continuance of the religious leadership . . . and many want an end to that rule and 
a more secular society with ties to the West.”156  In addition to the demand for free 
elections and civil liberties, it seems that the idea of the “absolute rule of the supreme 
jurist [velayat-e faqih-e motlaqeh] is no longer acceptable to the majority of Iranians.”157 
“The true leaders of the opposition—students, women, human rights activists, and 
political activists—have little desire to work in a theocratic regime or in a government 
within the frame work of the existing constitution.”158  
 Although there are deep and concerning differences in what many protesters are 
calling for and what the Green Movement’s leaders are calling for, Mousavi is trying 
hard to unify the movement’s efforts.  He stressed the importance of a unified approach 
and the strengthening of interactions within the movement as well as relying on the 
common values that unite the diverse segments within it.159 The idea is to frame the 
Green Movement as a movement that appeals to the demands of a broad range of society.  
The movement does appear to be drawing in a broad range of society through the 
demonstrations.160   
 One argument against the Green Movement is that its demands are “mainly the 
very immediate demands of the middle class.”161 Conversely, but yet another argument 
criticizing the Green Movement, is that the current diversity weakens the strength of the 
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movement.  Attempting to satisfy the demands of all the people is “practically impossible 
and not logical, because such a great expectation in such a large scale will force the 
movement to expand and add to its demands too much in order to attract everybody to the 
movement.”162 Despite the many different motives of the movement’s supporters, the 
Green Movement has been able to maintain support because of its broad range of 
demands.  “In the era of tele-communications and when the world has become a village 
with billions of different motives, demands and tastes, the “specific demands” of one 
class or layer of society do not necessarily have to be the demands of “all the people” 
anymore.”163  
F. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY SUMMARY 
 The Green Movement contains enough attributes of Social Movement Theory to 
be considered a social movement.  With this identification, the Green Movement has 
enough attributes in place to be viewed as a significant threat to the Iranian regime.  The 
Green Movement has “succeeded in damaging the regime’s legitimacy, weakening the 
appeal of the populist, self-promoting public ceremonies, and making it costlier for the 
government to stage any future rigged elections.”164 In addition to pressures from the 
Green Movement, the regime also faces popular disenchantment, elite fragmentation, 
international pressure, and economic distress.165 Several political opportunities are 
present for the Green Movement, and more may arise with the presidential elections in 
2013 when new leaders that are sympathetic to the reformists’ cause could come into 
positions of power.  Another positive attribute of the Green Movement is that it has been 
very successful in framing its cause in a manner that has motivated those who support the 
movement do so vehemently.  However, the Green Movement does not have any formal 
mobilizing structures to support it with resources or give the movement formal and 
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unified direction.  Another challenge that remains for the Green Movement is to gain the 
support of those who have not voiced support yet, the rural, and the lower class.   
The Green Movement has many appealing attributes that may still sway these 
groups to side with the movement, if only they can find a way to inform and 
communicate effectively with those who have not come out in support.  The demand for 
more civil liberties and less repressive rule are issues that are appealing to most Iranians.  
As well, many Iranians desire to be less isolated from the rest of the world; they want 
inclusion and coexistence—another desire for the Green Movement.166 A “priority for 
many Iranians is joining the world and ending cultural isolation.”167 The Green 
Movement’s most appealing attribute may be in its method of demanding change.  Its 
nonviolent approach is lauded by vocal Green Movement supporters, silent sympathizers, 
and the international community. 
However, despite having many positive attributes and millions of supporters, it 
does not appear that the Green Movement will affect regime reform in the near future.  
The regime’s crackdowns on protests in 2010 have made the Green Movement appear to 
have stalled.  Because of the lack of visible support in recent months, it now even appears 
that the movement is shrinking.  “Events on the ground continue to confirm our 
assessment that the social base for the Green Movement is shrinking, not growing.”168 
The regime’s plan—their “soft war”—for dealing with the Green Movement appears to 
have been effective.  The regime launched “a comprehensive campaign to crack down on 
the new social media practices such as Facebook and blogging, to purge universities and 
the traditional media reformers, to arrest activists prior to planned demonstration dates, 
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campaign has been so effective that many writers on the Green Movement now share the 
feeling that “the prospect of a quick and easy change of regime in Tehran seems 
remote.”170   
 There are two other very significant factors in why the Green Movement is 
waning.  First, there is the risk of retribution by the regime.  Retribution could come in 
many forms such as job loss, expulsion from school, imprisonment, injury, or even death.  
One Iranian citizen stated, “I would not be willing to risk life or limb simply to change 
slightly the powers of the [Supreme] Leader.”171 The other reason for the Green 
Movement’s failure to enlist the support of the entire nation is the revulsion to upsetting 
the status quo, both in the form of the regime’s current leadership and the disruption to 
society.  “Most Iranians . . . are not attracted by the prospect of sustained political and 
social disruption.”172   
 Whatever the reasons for the Green Movement’s inability to reach the “tipping 
point” where it has overwhelming support that would force regime reform, the leaders of 
the Green Movement believe that the grievances are strong enough so that the Iranian 
regime will eventually have to reform its current domestic policies.  The spokesman for 
Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Abdolkarim Soroush stated: 
Not meeting these [demands] of the Green Movement and increasing the 
[violent] crackdown and oppression will not only not help us to pass the 
[present] crisis, but it will also deepen the crisis with painful 
consequences, for which only the Supreme Leader will be responsible.173  
Mousavi himself has called for patience.  Mousavi stated on his website in early 2010 
that, “we have to call the next year the year of patience and endurance until the aims of 
the Green Movement are achieved.”174 Patience is exactly what the Green Movement 
will need to affect reform in the Iranian regime.  
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IV.  OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSEQUENCES 
A. SHOULD THE U.S.. INTERVENE IN IRAN TO PROMOTE REGIME 
REFORM? 
 U.S.. intervention in Iran using instruments of soft power designed to 
promote reform and weaken the Iranian regime would likely yield results if undertaken in 
a nuanced fashion.  As established in Chapter I, it is within U.S.. national interests to 
intervene in Iran to promote regime reform.  Also, as found in Chapter II, the Iranian 
regime is strong enough to suppress the Green Movement on its own.  In Chapter III, 
weaknesses in the Green Movement were identified that, if strengthened, could propel the 
movement to affect reform in the Iranian regime.  Although it seems probable that the 
Green Movement will eventually affect regime reform, if U.S.. support is not provided 
soon, the next opportunity for Iranian regime reform may not come until after Iran 
develops a nuclear weapons capability.    
 The motivation for the United States to intervene in Iran extends beyond U.S.. 
national interests of spreading democratic ideals, limiting human rights violations, and 
preventing nations from supporting terrorist organizations.  If the Green Movement is 
able to affect regime reform, then the United States could begin to deal with a “new” 
Iran.  A more Western-friendly Iranian government may be open to new trade agreements 
and discussion of Iran not acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.  A “new” Iran without 
an authoritarian and brutish regime could calm the fears of the rest of the Middle East of 
an Iranian hegemony.   
If the Green Movement succeeds, it will create a democratic nation which 
would very likely end up being an ally of other democratic nations against 
dictatorships in the Middle East.  A democratic and non-theocratic Iran 
could be reasoned with so it would stop funding Hamas and Hezbollah and 
sending IEDs to Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda in Iraq.  Helping 
them is essentially furthering U.S.. interests in the region.175 
                                                 
175 Shahryar, “Can the U.S.. Help Iran’s Green Movement?” 
 52
 The United States has three options in regard to Iran.  The first option is that the 
United States can chose to not intervene and see if the Green Movement can succeed on 
its own over time.  The benefit of this option is that the Green Movement could not be 
delegitimized by being linked to the United States.  The consequence for the United 
States is that regime reform to a more democratic state could take longer, or not happen 
at all.  The second option is that the United States could intervene overtly to support the 
Green Movement.  The benefit is that the international community and the Green 
Movement would clearly know that it had the support of the United States.  A 
consequence for the United States is that the Green Movement could presume a 
commitment by the United States to the Green Movement and the Iranian people.  The 
third option is for the United States to assist the Green Movement covertly.  The benefit 
of this option is that it would be difficult for the regime to prove that the Green 
Movement was illegitimate because it was linked to the United States.  The consequence 
for the United States is that, if discovered, diplomatic negotiations with Iran could 
become more difficult.    
 The Green Movement may not accept support U.S.. support if it is offered.  The 
Green Movement desires to be seen as a legitimate movement with legitimate grievances.  
Any link to “corrupted” Western nations—especially the United States—would be 
harmful to the movement by allowing the regime to “demonize and discredit the 
opposition as American pawns and puppets.”176  If the United States chose to intervene 
either overtly or covertly, the United States would need to convince the Green Movement 
that U.S.. support will help them affect regime reform sooner.  The United States cannot 
intervene without their support, so the United States should explain “first, that resolution 
of the nuclear issue would benefit the Iranian people and, second, that the United States 
has long experience at pressing dictatorships on human rights.”177Furthermore, the 
United States would need to express to the Green Movement that any support given 
would be to enhance their efforts, and U.S.. support would not dominate or intentionally 
harm their efforts.  The Green Movement would be able to accept or deny any support 
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offered.  All support efforts would retain an Iranian “face” where there would be no 
indication of U.S.. influence or motives.  The U.S.. goals would be to assist in 
implementation and dissemination of Green Movement propaganda and to hone the 
messages of reformist themes.  With the United States’ intent clearly laid out to Green 
Movement leaders, the United States may be able to convince the Green Movement that 
U.S.. support would be far more beneficial than harmful. 
B. WHAT THE GREEN MOVEMENT NEEDS TO BE SUCCESSFUL 
 There are four things that the Green Movement needs to be successful.  They are: 
credibility, support of many key political and religious leaders, the support of a 
significant number of the Iranian population, and to be a significant threat to the regime 
where the regime feels that it would not be able to permanently suppress the movement.  
The Green Movement can maintain its credibility and legitimacy by continuing to be 
perceived as a movement of the Iranian people, representing true grievances of the 
citizens of Iran.  The movement’s non-violent method of demanding reform is a powerful 
means in maintaining credibility.  It suggests that movement does not want to do any 
harm, only good.  The Green Movement needs to be wary of accepting support from non-
Iranians.  This could give ammunition for the regime to attack the Green Movement’s 
legitimacy by claiming that the movement is only a puppet of a foreign power.  As 
mentioned previously, any external support received must avoid the perception of 
consisting of anything but the Green Movement’s own voice.  Key political and religious 
leaders are necessary to change laws and affect reform within the government.  Without 
the support of established key political and religious leaders, the Green Movement does 
not have a means to get reform measures passed through parliament.  The support of a 
significant number of the population is necessary to display to key leaders that most of 
the Iranian people desire change.  Key leaders need to be sensitive to what the people 
want and should press for reform measures if it appears that the grievances are supported 
by the majority of the people.  Political and religious leaders may press for reform on 
their own if the Green Movement is perceived to be a significant threat to the regime.  It 
comes down to an issue of self-preservation.  If leaders fear that the regime may collapse 
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or change radically because of Green Movement pressure, those leaders will want to be 
seen as supporters of change so that they are not ousted from their current positions when 
change occurs.   
 There are several means in which the Green Movement can increase its odds for 
success.  Some of these opportunities could be accomplished by the Green Movement 
alone, or United States assistance could be accepted to help strengthen the movement’s 
influence.   
C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES INTERVENTION 
 1. Framing Messages 
 U.S.. assets can help the Green Movement to frame its messages to get the 
maximum effect out of them.  Information Operations consisting of Psychological 
Operations teams would work with existing Green Movement grievances to produce 
messages with just the right wording so that the themes resonate with many different 
sectors of Iranian society.  The Green Movement already has several powerful slogans 
and symbols, but with help of professionals who know how to appeal to emotions 
through wording, the Green Movement may be able to appeal to Iranians who have not 
yet been vocally supportive.  The goal of message framing is to increase recruitment and 
support. 
 Two themes to tap into are the women’s movement and the student movement.  
The Green Movement and these two movements can mutually benefit each other.  The 
Green Movement shares many of the same grievances as the women’s movement, 
including the elimination of discrimination against women and changing discriminatory 
laws.  In addition, the presence of women during protests contributes to less violence.178 
The Green Movement will be better able to maintain its non-violent tactic during future 
protests with more women present.  Framing messages that resonate with the women’s 
movement could draw more women to overtly support the Green Movement.  Another 
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movement, the student movement, is a large and diverse recruiting base for the Green 
Movement because “it serves as a cross-point for other individual movements such as 
women, labor, and ethnic group movements.  The student movement effectively creates a 
space for a coalition on undecided positions among various groups.”179  The institution of 
the University has a power of outreach and influence that is in many ways stronger than 
those of political parties due to the students’ ability to understand various forces and 
bring them together, then transmit this understanding and awareness through word-of-
mouth to the general public.180  In many ways, recruitment of students may be more 
important that the recruitment of the general public.  Because much of Iran’s population 
is young and educated, Iran’s youth are gaining referential social status.181  “Now, many 
families confidently look to their children for views on political issues.”182 Messages that 
are framed to appeal to students will be passed on to their families.  This is one way of 
getting messages to a sector of Iranians even if the family members are resistant to the 
ideology of the Green Movement.   
2. Provide Media Platforms 
The United States can provide media platforms to transmit messages across Iran.  
Because of technology these platforms do not have to reside within Iran.  The United 
States could provide a dedicated Internet server located in a third-party nation that could 
not be censored or blocked by the Iranian regime.  This server could provide an unfiltered 
medium for pro-Green Movement communications.  Green Movement-friendly websites 
and blogs could use this sever to express opinions, recruit, frame messages, and organize 
events.   Virtual Private Network and proxy server software could be loaded onto this 
server to protect those who submit ideas to the websites and blogs from retribution from 
the regime.  This software helps provide anonymity to users and authors.  
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 Green Movement TV could promote discussion about the regime in the more rural 
areas where Internet access does not exist and word-of-mouth communication is 
dominant.  Satellite television transmitters could be leased to broadcast pro-Green 
Movement advertisements, discussions, and messages to Iranian citizens who do not have 
Internet access.  Many Iranians—the poor and rural—do not have computers but do have 
satellite TV.  The poor and rural populations tend to support the regime, so the Green 
Movement needs to be able to reach out to these groups.  A TV station could reach these 
groups and could inform them of the problems with the Iranian regime, the effects on the 
rest of the Iranian population, and why their support is needed.   
3. Increase Regime’s Cost to Survive 
The United States, through supporting Green Movement’s communications 
abilities, can weaken the Iranian regime by increasing its cost to survive.  The attention 
and effort that the regime must give to countering the Green Movement has created a 
huge burden on the regime.183 Over time, this burden may weaken the regime enough 
where they are no longer strong enough to resist the Green Movement’s demands for 
reform.  In order to repress a massive movement of millions of people involved, the 
regime has expended “public funds on its repressive operations instead of plundering 
them for its own benefit.”184 U.S.. IO and PSYOP support to the Green Movement can 
supply messaging to inundate Iran with information that speaks negatively about the 
regime.  Besides electronic media support, the United States can provide thousands of 
mass-produced leaflets, posters, and banners that can be covertly plastered around urban 
centers by Green Movement supporters.  This type of media support that attacks the 
regime could have messages that: 1) highlight the departure of people who have left 
government positions, 2) highlight the internal struggles within the regime and its 
fragility, 3) highlight the differences in the ruling class, 4) highlight that violations of 
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human rights in Iran are beyond that of other countries,185 5) discredit IRGC-connected 
firms for their lead role in human rights abuses,186 and 6) highlight that the friends of the 
regime are the most authoritarian (Russia, China, and North Korea), most corrupt 
(Zimbabwe and Syria), and most violent (Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas).187 
4. Provide Information That Was Censored from the Iranian People 
 The United States can provide Green Movement supporters information about the 
Iranian regime’s harmful practices with supporting evidence that has not been censored 
by the regime.  The Iranian regime censors information from Iranian citizens.  For many 
Iranians, especially in areas outside the major urban centers, the stories about human 
rights violations and how poorly the regime is doing are just that—stories without proof.  
By providing evidence to support stories about the regime, the Green Movement may win 
the support of Iranians who doubt how repressive and harmful the regime has been.   
5. Fund Iranian Diaspora 
The enormous resource of the Iranian diaspora has not been completely 
mobilized.188  “Across the world there are around 3 million successful Iranians, the 
majority of whom want democracy.  Without their help, it is not possible to build a 
democratic Iran.”189 The Iranian diaspora are important for two reasons.  First, they 
provide a vital link to friends and family that still live in Iran.  Secondly, they can work 
from within their current countries of residence to create a larger coalition to mobilize 
forces better.  The Iranian diaspora can promote the work of journalists and civil society 
activists who have been expelled from Iran, they can pass uncensored information to 
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friends and family in Iran, and the diaspora can organize rallies to promote the Green 
Movement’s causes which could attract the attention of governments to put additional 
political pressure on the Iranian regime.   
6. Coordinate Media Distribution Programs 
The United States can help the Green Movement by analyzing areas within Iran 
where support is weak, and then create a plan to distribute media and information about 
the Green Movement and the negative aspects of the regime to those areas.  Due to the 
Green Movement’s decentralized nature—no hierarchal organizational structure with 
divisions to address specific functions—an outside coordination group can help to 
identify weaknesses and address them.  One of these weaknesses is getting information to 
rural areas.  One means to get information out is to mass-produce DVDs or informational 
flyers that can be delivered to these areas.  The United States can produce this media, 
identify where it needs to go, and then coordinate a plan for Green Movement supporters 
to enact the distribution plan. 
7. Encourage Clerics to Support Green Movement Through Covert 
Funding 
Because the Iranian regime has accused the Green Movement of “irreligiosity 
[sic] and dependence on foreigners,” the presence of the clergy in the movement is 
vital.190 Clerics who support the Green Movement would give it credibility by proving 
that Iranians can be both good Muslims and support the Green Movement.  Clerics, seen 
as having intentions driven by the Islamic faith and not linked to Western ideals, would 
counter the regime’s claim that the Green Movement’s reformist ideas would corrupt 
Islamic values and the correct way to live.  The Green Movement claims to have the 
support of many clerics, although they are afraid to show their support.191 Unfortunately 
for the Green Movement, only the fundamentalist clerics are vocal; however, “the actions 
                                                 
190 Mohammad J. Akbarien, “The Protest Movement and Religious Seminaries: Green or Black?,” 
gozaar.org, June 14, 2010, http://www.gozaar.org/english/articles-en/The-Protest-Movement-and-
Religious-Seminaries-Green-or-Black.html (accessed August 2, 2010). 
191 Akbarien, “The Protest Movement.” 
 59
and views of a few biased fundamentalist clerics do not reflect the views of all clerics and 
the maraje-e taqlid [sources of religious emulation].”192 The inability for the clerics to 
voice their support is based on two things.  First, the tradition of taqiyya (concealing 
one’s beliefs) dominates the seminaries and has priority over the virtue of courage.  For 
this reason there is the impression that the seminarians do not support the Green 
Movement.193  “But the innermost beliefs of the majority of the seminarians are at odds 
with their silent or masked appearance.” 194 The second problem is that clerics get their 
funding from the Center of Administration which is controlled by the Office of the 
Supreme Leader.  If nonconformist clerics fail to heed warning from the center, “this 
center discontinues their funding or refers them to the Special Court for Clerics, where 
they will face punishment.”195 The United States can help nonconformist clerics by 
covertly funneling money to them through “donations” by Green Movement supporters.  
This solution will not prevent the fear of potential punishment, but at least the clerics will 
be less dependent on financial support from the state.  External funding will allow clerics 
to not have to conceal their beliefs for fear of losing funding to support their mosque and 
supported programs.  
D. CONSEQUENCES OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION 
 There are several consequences for the United States if it chooses to intervene in 
Iran’s domestic affairs.  If support was overt or if covert support was discovered, the 
United States would lose credibility because the United States would be breaking an 
international treaty without causation.  The 1981 Algiers Accords was a promise by the 
United States not to intervene in Iran’s domestic affairs.  Breaking this agreement with 
Iran could affect the United States’ credibility amongst the international community 
concerning future foreign policy.  Another political issue is that unilateral operations, in 
the event that the United States intervenes covertly, would be counter to the U.S.. 
multilateral policy in dealing with Middle Eastern affairs.  The United States desires to 
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have the support and the weight of other countries behind Middle Eastern foreign policy.  
A multilateral approach counters the Middle East’s perception that intervention is totally 
in the United State’s self-interests.  In addition, the United States would likely lose the 
support of Russia, China, and India in enforcing economic sanctions against Iran. 
E. INTERVENTION USING SOFT POWER 
Soft power is the best way to affect Iranian regime reform.  Soft power is the 
power of attraction that is associated with ideas, cultures, and policies.196  Soft power 
involves the use of foreign and domestic policies, words, actions, and images in a 
sustained effort to influence and change the environment of the targeted country or 
population.   Soft power can be more effective than military might.  Khamenei stated in 
2003:  
More than Iran’s enemies need artillery, guns and so forth, they need to 
spread cultural values that lead to moral corruption.  They have said this 
many times.  I recently read in the news that a senior official in an 
important American political center said: ‘Instead of bombs, send them 
miniskirts.’  He is right.  If they arouse sexual desires in any given 
country, if they spread unrestrained mixing of men and women, and if they 
lead youth to behavior to which they are naturally inclined by instincts, 
there will no longer be any need for artillery and guns against that 
nation.197   
 This statement indicates that Iranian conservatives are concerned about the 
influence of soft power.  The most effective way of exploiting the Iranian regime’s 
concern about soft power is through influence and information operations.  Through 
influence and information operations, the Green Movement can challenge the regime’s 
propaganda and ideology. 
 Soft power includes influence operations such as Information Operations (IO), 
including Psychological Operations and Computer Network Operations.  Aspects of 
Unconventional Warfare can also be used to affect changes without the use of force.  
Influence operations are the employment of capabilities to affect behaviors, protect 
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operations, communicate commander’s intent, and project accurate information to 
achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain.198  IO is the integrated employment 
of the core capabilities of Psychological Operation and Computer Network Operations in 
concert with specified supporting and related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt or 
usurp adversarial human and automated decision making.199  IO is a medium through 
which soft power can be projected.  Examples of IO capabilities that currently exist and 
being implemented towards Iran are Radio Farda and Voice of America Persian 
Television.  These networks broadcast in Persian and claim to reach 70 percent of the 
Iranian population under the age of 30.200  IO concepts used to support the Green 
Movement must not only be responsive to changes, but also use the same standards and 
techniques employed by regionally respected networks like the BBC and Al Jazeera.  
Enabling access to social networking websites can enhance the IO effort.  Social 
networking sites are very popular in Iran and there are an estimated 46,000 bloggers.201  
Social networking websites can be used to support influencing operations and IO by 
using sites such as Twitter, Facebook, My Space, and blogs.  These sites can be used by 
elements inside and outside Iran to communicate, rally support, and pass information in 
support of the Green Movement.  The ability to use these sites, even when the regime 
attempts to block them, was demonstrated during the post-election protests and 
subsequent regime crack down in Tehran in June 2009. 
 Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are planned operations used to convey 
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals.202  A successful example related to Iran is when 
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Khomeni distributed audio tapes prior to the 1979 revolution to gain support.  A modern 
version of this would be the distribution of DVD’s containing government documents and 
television and radio broadcasts of speeches that target the regime’s corruption, human 
rights violations, regime fissures, IRGC domination, and economic failures of the regime.  
Documentaries that highlight events such as the death of Neda Agha Soltan during the 
2009 protests and pictures and videos that could expose inhumane treatment of political 
prisoners are examples of PSYOP that could be employed. 
 Computer Network Operations (CNO) are comprised of computer network attack, 
computer network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling 
operations.203  CNO operations can be employed to target official regime websites 
through hacking, defacements, and Denial of Service or Distributed Denial of Service 
attacks.  Examples of this are the use of government systems or patriotic hackers like the 
cyber attacks on Georgia in 2008 and Estonia in 2003.  The Russian government was 
suspected, but no direct connections could be established in those attacks.  However, 
there are dangers in conducting CNO.  Pro-regime hacking communities could target 
United States networks, websites, and systems.  CNO can also target the regime’s 
extensive ability to filter content from outside sources and networks. CNO can also be 
used to defend Green Movement networks, servers, and websites used to deliver IO and 
PSYOP efforts against Iranian CNO efforts.  The regime employs extensive technologies 
to defend against network attacks and to control and censor Internet activity.  
Technologies such as virtual private networks and proxy servers and access to satellite-
based Internet services are ways around regime efforts.  CNO operations can be used to 
gather information from regime networks that can be used against the regime.  Examples 
would be gaining access to internal documents that high light regime corruption, human 
rights abuses, regime fissures, and regime failures. 
 Unconventional Warfare (UW) will play an important role in implementing the 
elements of soft power.  UW for intervention to support the Green Movement does not 
involve the employment of military personnel within the borders of Iran.  The objectives 
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of an UW effort would be to facilitate the training and equipping of members of the 
Green Movement so they can implement an information operations campaign, build 
capacity, and increase capability. Instead of putting boots on the ground, the engagement 
and training of members of the Green Movement would be done through cultural and 
academic exchange programs in third party countries in the region, in Europe, or in the 
United States.  Equipment and materials could also be provided for the trained personnel 
to take back with them.  An important aspect of the training is the ability to recruit 
personnel that can help develop products and messages that are effective and easily 
understood by the targeted audience.  An intricate knowledge of Iranian society, culture, 
and politics will be essential to UW operators. 
F. WHEN SHOULD THE UNITED STATES ACT? 
 The United States could assist the Green Movement immediately, or the United 
States can wait for Iran to turn down a good offer before the United States acts.  If the 
Iranian regime turns down a “grand bargain”—where the United States openly agrees to 
not interfere with Iran’s domestic issues in exchange for Iran not obtaining a nuclear 
weapons capability—then it would be seen that the United States has exhausted its 
options in regards to Iran.  The United States can continue with its sanctions on Iran, but 
“reformers generally agree that sanctions to date have not been useful.”204  By waiting 
for the Iranian regime to deny any last possibility of negotiations with the United States, 
the idea of allocating funds to assist the Green Movement may be seen as a last option, 
thus being easier for Congress to swallow.   
G. SCOPE OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION 
 The scope of intervention—overt or covert—for this thesis is narrowed to go 
beyond the current policies of diplomatic engagement and persuasion, but not to the 
extreme of full military engagement.  Diplomatic options—foreign policy, sanctions, 
etc.—is left outside this thesis for other political analysts to determine.  On the other 
extreme, full military engagement is widely viewed to be used as a last resort, if at all.  A 
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few negatives of this option are: lack of U.S.. domestic support, vehement opposition for 
Europe, Russia, and China, the requirement of massive troop movements that would 
divert assets away from Afghanistan and Iraq, and it would take years to establish a stable 
government.205   
 The scope of intervention should be a “middle line” option that supplements 
current U.S.. policy towards Iran.  The United States should constrain intervention by: 1) 
having no U.S.. military forces or advisors in Iran, 2) not being involved in any kinetic 
action or supplying weapons, and 3) using only soft power to enhance the Green 
Movement.  The U.S.. objective is to enhance the Green Movement in order to affect 
Iranian regime reform to influence future Iranian policy. 
H. COA #1: NO ACTION 
1. Concept of the Operation 
 The United States continues its current policies and approaches towards Iran.  The 
administration continues diplomatic efforts through persuasion, engagement, and 
economic sanctions.  The United Nations will continue to be used as a multilateral effort 
to influence the Iranian regime’s behavior. 
2. Opportunities 
 The United States will continue diplomatic efforts on issues such as nuclear 
weapons and human rights.  In return for Iran to not pursue a nuclear weapons capability, 
the United States could offer incentives such as membership in the World Trade 
Organization, the easing or elimination of economic sanctions, investment in 
infrastructure, and the recognition of Iran as a regional power.  The United States, either 
unilaterally or with the United Nations, could seek to add or increase the severity of 
existing sanctions in order to force them to the negotiating table.   
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3. Consequences 
The most severe consequence of no action is that Iran will most likely remain an 
authoritarian regime that continues to pursue a nuclear weapons capability.  A nuclear 
weapons capable Iran may ignite an arms race in the Middle East to counter the threat of 
an Iranian hegemony.  Diplomatic relations with Iran will continue to remain poor and 
Iran will continue to disrupt the current negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization through Hamas, Hezbollah, and its Quds force.  Human rights 
violations will continue as harsher economic sanctions take effect and regime paranoia 
increases.  Without U.S.. intervention, the Green Movement is more likely to fail or take 
longer to affect change.  The United States is less likely to strike an agreement on the 
nuclear weapons issue with the current authoritarian regime than it would with a more 
reform-minded regime that is friendlier to globalization and the West. 
I. COA #2: COVERT INTERVENTION 
1. Concept of the Operation 
The United States government unilaterally employs soft power using IO, PSYOP, 
CNO and UW in support of the Green Movement in a manner that hides U.S.. support.  
The intent of the support is to increase the effectiveness of the Green Movement, counter 
regime propaganda and ideology, and exploit internal fissures within the regime in order 
to affect regime reform.  Covert intervention would be a coordinated effort that continues 
to utilize diplomacy but also involves military and interagency cooperation.  Covert 
support includes the development of strategy, IO, actions and themes, and funding for the 
Green Movement to use against the Iranian regime.  Covert intervention would utilize 
elements of influencing operations and UW.  Covert intervention would be a unilateral 
effort by the United States in order to maintain secrecy.  A multilateral effort would run 
the risk of discovery and would enable the regime to discredit the Green Movement.  Any 
direct support from U.S.. personnel would occur in border regions outside of Iran.  When 
necessary, Green Movement supporters would cross the border to neighboring countries 
to receive training and materials, and then return to Iran to disseminate the materials. 
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2. Opportunities 
Covert support can increase the effectiveness of the Green Movement, counter 
regime propaganda and ideology, and exploit internal fissures within the regime in order 
to affect regime reform without the regime being able to use U.S.. support against the 
Green Movement.  Any of the opportunities outlined earlier in this chapter can be used in 
covert intervention.  It will be critical in the IO and UW efforts to avoid U.S.. 
government signature in format, origin, or support.  The Iranian diaspora can be heavily 
used to gain access into Iran.   The United States can still employ and improve some 
overt assets such as Radio Farda and Voice of America Persian Television.  
Improvements in these capabilities can distract the regime from discovering covert 
efforts.   
 PSYOP can be used to expose instances of corruption, economic problems, 
regime abuses, and fractures among regime elites.  A campaign can also be designed to 
highlight that a nuclear weapons program undermines Iranian security and relations with 
the West and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations.  This can be done through social 
networking sites, pro-Green Movement websites, and the infiltration of DVDs and 
printed material through smuggling routes or hidden in items brought in by returning 
Iranians or normal imports.  Examples would be to hide Green Movement propaganda, 
framed messages, and documents harmful to the regime on DVD’s via technologies such 
as stenography. 
 Patriotic hackers can be employed to conduct CNO to disrupt regime websites and 
government e-services.  Denial of Service attacks could be launched using servers and 
computers located in multiple countries while avoiding a direct link to any U.S.. 
government or personal involvement.  Green Movement supporters can be trained to 
employ social engineering tools to gain access to government computers and servers in 
order to extract information about regime activities.  This information can then be used in 
PSYOP efforts and spread through social networking tools.    
3. Consequences 
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The most significant consequence of covert U.S.. intervention is that, if 
discovered, it could invoke a regime crackdown using IRGC, Basij and other security 
forces in a violent effort to maintain power. The regime could increase its 
authoritarianism, resulting in increases in human rights abuses, lethal force against 
activists, and arrests of Green Movement leaders, regime officials, clerics, or Iranian 
elites who indicate support for the movement.  Signs of U.S.. intervention could cause 
some Iranians to rally around the regime or, conversely, threaten IRGC power and 
influence.  A threat to IRGC power could cause them to act boldly by cracking down, 
thus creating a more authoritarian military state.  The consequence of improperly framed 
messages could delegitimize the Green Movement or cause the Green Movement to 
overplay its hand in anticipation of more U.S.. support.  Intervention could accelerate 
regime efforts to build nuclear weapons and delivery systems.  Iran could retaliate 
through proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel, attack European and United 
States interests in the region, or increase support for the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  
Intervention could also trigger the Iranian regime to close the Strait of Hormuz, which 
would disrupt shipments of oil and cause a global spike in oil prices. 
J. COA #3: OVERT SUPPORT 
1. Concept of the Operation 
The U.S.. government employs soft power using IO, PSYOP, CNO, and UW in 
support of the Green Movement in a manner that does not attempt to hide U.S.. support.  
The intent of the support is to increase the effectiveness of the Green Movement, counter 
regime propaganda and ideology, and exploit internal fissures within the regime in order 
to affect regime reform.  This must be a coordinated effort that involves the military and 
interagency cooperation, coordination, and de-confliction.  Overt support includes the 
development of strategy, IO, actions and themes, and funding for the Green Movement to 
use against the Iranian regime.  The United States must not implicate GCC nations and 
other Western nations.  This could cause retaliation against other Western nations and 
domestic backlash GCC governments if these countries are seen as cooperating with 
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U.S.. meddling in Iranian domestic affairs.  As with covert intervention, overt 
intervention would not involve U.S.. personnel in Iran. 
2. Opportunities 
Overt intervention allows the United States its boldest and most aggressive option 
in supporting the Green Movement’s efforts to counter the regime’s rhetoric, ideology, 
proclaimed capabilities, and propaganda.  There is also the opportunity to take advantage 
of the Iranian people’s desire for closer ties with the West.  PSYOP could be used to 
expose instances of corruption, economic problems, regime abuses, and fractures among 
regime elites.  A campaign can also be designed to highlight that a nuclear weapons 
program undermines Iranian security and relations with the West and GCC nations. 
 CNO can provide an opportunity to disrupt or defeat Iranian censorship efforts 
and open up access to more sources of external information.  CNO would facilitate 
greater communication between Green Movement members, the Iranian diaspora, and 
others interested in learning more about regime reform.  Providing equipment and 
software to support the use of virtual private networks, proxy servers and satellite-based 
Internet services are examples of ways to bypass the regime’s control and censorship of 
the Internet.  The use of CNO can also be used to extract information from regime 
networks to discredit the regime, highlight corruption, and identify abuses.   
 PSYOP can improve the messaging in existing assets such as radio and television 
broadcasts into Iran.  These assets currently exist but can be expanded to satellite-based 
services.  Material that exposes regime abuses and crimes can be provided to regionally 
respected media outlets such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabia for broadcast in legitimate news 
stories.  The Internet is also an invaluable tool in getting messages and materials into the 
country and in the hands of Green Movement supporters.  
3. Consequences 
The consequences of overt action are the same as in covert intervention.  In 
addition, the employment of CNO can be viewed as an attack on the regime and its 
sovereignty by the United States if done overtly, resulting in the regime employing its 
own CNO capabilities against United States and allied networks as retaliation.  This 
could also result in retaliation via proxy assets, such as Hezbollah, in the region. 
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V. GAME THEORY ANALYSIS OF U.S.. INTERVENTION 
OPTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Game theory looks at behaviors of rational players to determine which strategies 
should be selected.  Game theory attempts to mathematically capture behavior in strategic 
situations, or games, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the 
choices of others.206 Game theory was chosen as a tool in this thesis because game theory 
outcomes very often reflect real-life outcomes.  When game theory was applied to the 
question of whether the United States should intervene in Iranian affairs and how, it was 
determined that the United States should covertly support the Green Movement.  There 
are several reasons for this outcome.  First, U.S.. intervention is necessary in order for the 
Green Movement to succeed in the near future.  Without U.S.. intervention, the Green 
Movement will either take years to affect regime reform or the Green Movement may 
never succeed.  Another factor in why game theory determined that U.S.. intervention is 
preferable is because, if the Green Movement succeeds in regime reform in part because 
of U.S.. assistance, the United States will likely have more influence in the reform-
minded Iranian regime.  This influence can help the United States in accomplishing its 
national security interests.   
B. GAME THEORY MATRIX, VARIABLES, AND PREFERENCE VALUES 
A 3x3 game theory matrix was used because the United States has three options 
for intervention with three forms of regime opposition.  Figure 6 shows a 3x3 game 
theory matrix where the United States options listed across the top of the matrix and the 
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Figure 6.  3x3 Game Theory Matrix without Preference Values 
 
We assumed that the United States has only three courses of action for this game: 
no action, covert support to affect regime reform, or overt support to affect regime 
reform.  No action is defined where the United States continues diplomatic efforts 
through persuasion, engagement, and economic sanctions.  Covert support is defined as 
unilateral employment of military soft power by the United States using IO, PSYOP, 
CNO, and UW in support of an opposition group in a manner that hides U.S.. support.  
Overt support is defined as unilateral employment of military soft power by the United 
States using IO, PSYOP, CNO, and UW in support of an opposition group in a manner 
that does not attempt to hide U.S.. support.  The three United States options are evaluated 
against three possible forms of Iranian regime opposition that could affect regime reform.   
We assume that the three forms of Iranian regime opposition are the Green 
Movement (GM), a coup, and an ethnic group uprising in Iran.  The Green Movement 
form of regime opposition represents the current Green Movement in Iran and is 
discussed in detail in Chapter III.  A coup is defined as the sudden, extra-legal deposition 
of a government.  In Iran, a coup would likely come from IRGC leadership seeking to 
take control over the government.  The ethnic group form of regime opposition is defined 
as one or several ethnic groups in Iran, such as the Kurds, Azeries, or Baluchis, in an 
effort to affect regime reform.  
The next step in game theory analysis is to use Utility Theory to help assign 
preference values to each of the United States options and forms of regime opposition.  In 
each of the nine options for U.S.. intervention an ordinal ranking based on a scale of 0-10 
is inserted for each X and Y position. On the scale, 10 indicates the best possible option 
and 0 indicates the worst possible option. The X position represents the preference 
No Action Covert Overt
GM X1,Y1 X2,Y2 X3,Y3
Coup X4,Y4 X5,Y5 X6,Y6
Ethnic X7,Y7 X8,Y8 X9,Y9
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ranking for the United States possible course of action (No Action, Covert, and Overt) 
when assessed against each of the three forms of regime opposition.  These assessments 
were made based on the PMESII analysis of the Iranian regime’s strengths and 
weaknesses discussed in Chapter II, the analysis of the Green Movement in Chapter III, 
and the course of action analysis on Chapter IV.  The impacts of the three United States 
courses of action on chances of success were also taken into account.   
Our preference values were also based on several key assumptions.  The 
assumptions that we made are: 
• The Green Movement, coup, and ethnic uprising are the three most likely 
forms of regime change. 
• A coup or ethnic uprising will not result in significant regime reform. 
• The United States desires greater influence with the Iranian government. 
• The Green Movement offers the best means to promote human rights and civil 
liberties. 
• A coup would result in a more authoritarian regime. 
• An ethnic uprising would lead to an ethnically fractured Iran resulting in 
instability. 
• Any link to the U.S.. government is detrimental to the credibility of any form 
of regime change. 
• The United States increases its opportunity for influence in a new Iranian 
regime by supporting an opposition movement. 
• Covert support would increase effectiveness of forms of regime change and 
protect their credibility. 
• The United States prefers to support the Green Movement versus support of a 
coup or ethnic uprising. 
• Green Movement leaders would be more open to discussion with the United 
States than other leaders of opposition movements. 
 
It was assessed that covert action was the preferred course of action when 
combined with the Green Movement.  However, covert action was not always seen as the 
preferred course of action.  No action by the United States was seen as preferred when 
the source of Iranian regime opposition was either a coup or ethnic uprising.  No action 
has the least risk to the United States or opposition groups; however, the United States 
does not increase its likelihood of gaining any ability to influence the opposition group if 
its leadership comes into positions of power.  Overt support is never preferred.  If U.S.. 
support is given, it must be covert to protect the credibility of the form of regime 
opposition.  Covert support for the Green Movement was ranked high (9 out of 10) 
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because of the higher likelihood of the Green Movement being successful when 
compared to other forms of regime opposition, and the potential influence the United 
States could have with Green Movement leadership who come into positions of power.  
The Y position represents the preference ranking of the three forms of regime 
opposition (GM, coup, ethnic) when assessed against one of the three United States 
courses of action.  The analysis of the Green Movement in Chapter III and the 
opportunities and consequences of the courses of action analyzed in Chapter IV were 
used to determine the preference ranking.  The likelihood of success for each form of 
regime opposition and the U.S.. impact on credibility were important factors determining 
the preference ranking.  
The Green Movement received higher preference values because of its 
demonstrated ability to mobilize a large number of the Iranian population, its ability to 
frame messages that appeal to many diverse groups, and its political opportunities 
through its associations with respected political and religious leaders.  The preference 
values for the other forms of regime opposition are low because our assessment indicates 
that a coup is possible but unlikely, and an ethnic uprising is not likely at all.  In addition, 
those who would rally a coup or ethnic uprising are least likely to accept any form of 
U.S.. support. 
C. GAME THEORY RESULTS 
 In Figure 7, the preference values for each X and Y variable have been inserted 
into the 3x3 payoff game theory matrix.  Game theory analysis can determine if there is a 
pure strategy—one single solution—or if a mixed strategy exists.  The game was 
analyzed to determine the best course of action for each player.  The analysis started with 
a movement diagram.  For movement diagrams in non-zero sum games, the row player 
wants to maximize payoffs, so they would prefer the highest payoff in each column.  The 
arrows in the columns indicate the highest payoff for the row player.  Similarly for the 
column player, they want to maximize their payoffs, so they would prefer the highest 
payoff in each row.  An arrow is drawn to the highest payoff in that row.  The arrows in 
the rows indicate the highest payoff for the column player.  If all arrows point inward for 
a cell in the payoff matrix, that point will be a pure Nash Equilibrium.  
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The movement diagram arrows point to the values that maximize the preferences 
for the players.  For example, in the first column, upper left section, 8 is greater than 3 so 
the arrow points up from 3 to 8.  This indicates that 8 is the preferred value.  The vertical 
arrows correspond to the X positions and the horizontal arrows correspond to the Y 









Figure 7.  3x3 Game Theory Matrix with Preference Values and Movement Diagram 
 
 By analyzing Figure 7, a Nash Equilibrium pure strategy was found at (9,8), 
which translates to U.S.. covert support for the Green Movement.  A Nash Equilibrium 
pure strategy indicates the dominant strategy where, if the scenario where the United 
States and other players chose different intervention options over multiple iterations, the 
results would attempt to achieve equilibrium at this solution. If any player tries to deviate 
from this point, neither player can improve their payoff.   Thus, the Nash Equilibrium 
represents the optimized solution for all players.  In addition, because it is a pure strategy, 
this single Nash Equilibrium solution indicates that there is only a single solution versus a 
mixed strategy. 
Mixed strategies are where a combination of strategies yields the most favorable 
results. An example of a mixed strategy finding would be for Player A to conduct Option 
Y 30 percent of the time and conduct Option Z 70 percent of the time.  However, the 
findings in this thesis determined a “pure strategy” where the United States should only 
support the Green Movement and that the United States should only support the Green 
Movement covertly.  In other words, the United States should not try to support other 
forms of Iranian regime opposition besides the Green Movement; and, the United States 
should intervene, but never do so overtly.   
No Action Covert Overt
GM 8,6 9,8 4,1
Coup 3,3 2,4 1,2
Ethnic 1,1 0,1 0,0
Nash Equilibrium Pure Strategy Solution at (9,8)
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In contrast, when the game was played using linear programming the results 
yielded a solution at (3,3), where a coup occurs and the United States does not intervene 
at all.  Although linear programming often results in a mixed strategy solution, the result 
was a mixed strategy pure strategy solution.  The linear programming solution indicates 
that the United States should choose to not intervene 100 percent of the time and the best 
form of regime opposition is a coup 100 percent of the time.  The results derived from 
linear programming show the best solution for one player by limiting the options of the 
other players.  However, this solution may not be the best option for either player.  Both 
players are always looking to do better.  In this game with the linear programming 
solution of (3,3), the intervention option of the United States could be better (no 
intervention has the preference ranking of 3 on a scale of 10) and the form of regime 
opposition could be better (coup has the preference ranking of 3 on a scale of 10). 
D. TWO SOLUTIONS: WHICH IS BETTER? 
 Game theory analysis has resulted in two different solutions.  The Nash 
Equilibrium solution indicates that the United States should covertly support the Green 
Movement.  The linear programming solution indicates that the United States should not 
intervene and hope a coup affects regime reform.  So, which one is the best solution?   
 The best solution is the Nash Equilibrium solution where the United States 
covertly supports the Green Movement.  There are several reasons to support this 
conclusion.  First, the Nash Equilibrium solution is supported by mathematical analysis 
for game theory.  The Nash Equilibrium solution at (9,8)  is the Pareto Optimal solution.   
The Pareto Optimal solution is mathematically the most efficient, or best, solution for all 
players.207  Mathematically better solutions tend to play out the same way in real life.  
Typically, the best solution mathematically has a higher probability of likelihood in real 
life.   Second, the Nash Equilibrium solution is supported by the research in this thesis.  
Third, the linear programming solution is less desirable because all players are going to 
seek a better solution.  Future changes to the initial solution may be less desirable to U.S.. 
interests.  Fourth, a coup in Iran does not support U.S.. national interests.  A coup would 
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not necessarily result in an infusion of reformist thought, openness to Western relations, 
stemming support for terrorist organizations, decreased human rights violations, 
increased civil liberties, or preventing the acquirement of a nuclear weapons capability.  
Finally, a coup is plausible but unlikely to occur.  And, even if a coup does occur, it is not 
a solution the United States wants to see in Iran.  A coup could destabilize a relatively 
stable Iran, and, as noted previously, may not support U.S.. national interests.  For these 
reasons the United States should not wait for a coup to occur on its own, but chose to 
intervene covertly in support of the Green Movement using instruments of soft power.   
 Game Theory results can vary widely due to assigned preference values.  The 
findings of this game theory analysis were largely determined by the preference values 
that were assigned to the variables.  The preference values given to the variables are 
subjective; however, the values reflect careful consideration and the weighing of many 
factors.   Considerations include questions such as: What option of intervention (or not) is 
the most beneficial for the United States?  How harmful is overt U.S.. support to the 
legitimacy of the Iranian regime’s opponent?  What form of opposition allows for future 
U.S.. influence in Iranian affairs?  Changing preference values can change the outcome of 
the game, but the values assigned in this game are pragmatic and reflect numerous 
perspectives. 
 Another consideration in this game theory analysis was choosing the forms of 
regime opposition.  The forms of opposition were limited to the three we felt were the 
likeliest threats to the current Iranian regime: the Green Movement, an internal coup, and 
an event where an ethnic group attempts to gain control over the government.  The game 
theory analysis indicates that the Green Movement is the dominant threat to the Iranian 
regime while the other threats to the regime are less substantial.   
 76
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 77
VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide U.S.. policymakers with an analysis of the 
opportunities and consequences resulting from intervention in Iran. The intent is to assist 
policymakers in determining whether the United States should intervene in Iran and 
support Iranian regime reform. Some political observers say that the movement in Iran is 
strong enough, and will eventually affect change in Iran.  Other political observers claim 
that, although the current Iranian regime is flawed and weak in some areas, it is still quite 
strong and is capable of putting down any rebellion.  There are U.S.. policymakers that 
feel we need to act now to help determine Iran’s future.  Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) 
and Sam Brownback (R-KS) have introduced the Iran Democratic Transition Act of 
2010.  This act would provide non-military assistance to the opposition movement and 
would establish a special envoy for democracy and human rights.  The goal of the act is 
to “deny the current regime the ability to oppress its own people and interfere with 
international affairs of its neighbors (including Iraq and Afghanistan), finance or support 
terrorist organizations, and develop weapons of mass destruction and the associated 
delivery systems.”208  
A. THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING INTERVENTION 
As outlined in Chapter I, Iranian regime reform falls within the U.S. national 
interests, but should the U.S.. intervene?  The answer to this question is ultimately to be 
decided by U.S.. policymakers. The analysis conducted in this thesis explored four 
supporting questions that need to be addressed before policymakers decide whether or not 
to intervene in Iran.  First, are there sufficient weaknesses in the Iranian regime that can 
be exploited to affect regime reform?  The analysis completed in Chapter II shows that 
while the regime remains strong, it has enough weaknesses in its political structure, 
military capabilities, economic sectors, social conditions, information capabilities, and 
state infrastructure that can be exploited to support regime reform if enough pressure is 
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brought to bear.  Second, what are the options available that can affect regime reform?  In 
Chapter III, the strengths and weaknesses of the Green Movement were examined 
through Social Movement Theory.  The Green Movement was assessed as the most 
viable option for affecting regime reform due to its demonstrated ability to effectively 
frame messages, mobilize large groups of Iranians and existing political and religious 
elite connections.  Third, if there is a viable opposition movement, what are the U.S.. 
options for affecting regime reform and the associated opportunities and consequences?  
In Chapter IV, an analysis of U.S.. options and the associated U.S.., regional, and Iranian 
domestic opportunities and consequences were examined for U.S.. policy makers. The 
three options assessed were no action, covert support, and overt support for regime 
reform, each with their own opportunities and consequences.  Finally, what course of 
action should the U.S.. choose?  In Chapter V, supported by the analysis in Chapters II-
IV, game theory was used to analyze the three U.S.. options along with three options for 
affecting regime reform in order to determine a course of action.   Through the use of 
game theory it was determined that  U.S.. covert support of the Green Movement using 
instruments of soft power designed to promote reform and weaken the Iranian regime 
would likely yield results.  
B. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION 
It was determined in this thesis that U.S.. covert intervention using instruments of 
soft power to promote reform and weaken the Iranian regime is necessary in order for the 
Green Movement to succeed.  Without U.S.. intervention, the Green Movement will 
either take years to affect regime reform or the Green Movement may never succeed.  
However, if U.S.. policy makers decide to intervene in Iran, there are several policy 
implications that need to be assessed.  Intervention could destabilize Iran.  If the regime 
feels sufficiently threatened, it could increase crackdowns on Iranians suspected of being 
associated with the Green Movement.  Certain elements, such as the IRGC, may feel 
threatened enough by a heightened regime reform effort that it would stage a coup in an 
effort to maintain an authoritarian regime.  If U.S.. involvement is discovered, it could 
result in the Iranian regime responding by deliberately increasing political and military 
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uncertainty in the greater Middle East.  The Iranian regime could accomplish this through 
increased support to Hezbollah and Hamas in order to further destabilize the Middle East 
peace process.  Iran could increase action by the IRGC’s Quds force in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in an effort to target American forces and further thwart currently tenuous 
and ongoing U.S.. efforts.  Iran could seek to close the Strait of Hormuz through the use 
of mines or anti-ship missiles, retaliate by attacking U.S.. ships and assets in the region, 
or accelerate its nuclear program.  Actions taken by Iran could have global economic 
impacts by creating a spike in international oil prices.  The impacts of this would be 
amplified by the current economic conditions in the United States and other countries 
around the world.  An accelerated nuclear weapons program could result in other nations 
in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, developing their own nuclear weapons 
programs in order to counter any real or perceived threat from Iran’s nuclear capability. 
C. POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES OF INTERVENTION 
However, U.S.. intervention could yield positive results from the employment of 
soft power through covert intervention in Iran.  A reform minded regime could come to 
power resulting in an Iranian government that is more receptive to U.S.. concerns, 
especially on the nuclear issue.  This could also pave the way for the renewal of 
diplomatic relations, the easing of economic sanctions, and a friendlier regime in Tehran.  
A rise in reform minded political, and possibly religious, elites might not change the 
regime dramatically, but this could open more channels for communication between the 
U.S.. and Tehran, place more pressure on Khamenei to enact reforms, and establish direct 
or multi lateral negotiations that achieve progress on the issues of weapons of mass 
destruction, support for terrorist organizations, human rights issues, and cooperation in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, this could lead to an Iran that is engaged in regional 
economic and security issues through the GCC and mitigate any possible conflict or arms 
race between Iran and Saudi Arabia over dominance in the region.   
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D. FUTURE RESEARCH AND ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED 
Further analysis could be done on affecting regime reform through diplomatic 
efforts of persuasion and engagement.  Future research could examine how much longer 
it would take to achieve U.S.. foreign policy objectives with Iran without any form of 
intervention.  Also, future analysis could be done on the international and regional impact 
of an IRGC-lead coup, the impact of a failed intervention, and how the United States 
should engage a new reform minded regime if one comes to power.  In addition, there 
needs to be more analysis on how to avoid overt ties between the Green Movement and 
the United States.  Finally, the United States needs to be prepared to maximize its 
political opportunities in the event of a shock occurring in Iran such as the unexpected 
death of Ayatollah Khamenei, the sudden removal of President Ahmadinejad, or a 
significant event that leads to the compromise of Iranian-controlled nuclear material.   
E. CONCLUSION 
U.S.. intervention in Iran using instruments of soft power designed to promote 
reform and weaken the Iranian regime would likely yield results if undertaken in a covert 
fashion. While diplomatic efforts of engagement and persuasion and economic sanctions 
might achieve regime reform in time, it would likely occur after Iran developed a nuclear 
weapons capability.  The Green Movement has shown the ability to frame messages that 
appeal to diverse groups of Iranians, mobilize large groups, and the potential for political 
opportunities through political elites.  Without U.S.. support, the Green Movement is 
unlikely to grow and organize into a force sufficiently strong enough to make regime 
reform a reality.  The current regime will be able to continue to suppress the Green 
Movement and eventually relegate it to the level of a nuisance effort.  U.S.. covert 
support to the Green Movement is necessary for it to achieve a tipping point that pushes 
the current regime towards reform.  If U.S.. support is not provided, the next opportunity 
for Iranian regime reform may not come until after Iran develops a nuclear weapons 
capability.    
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APPENDIX:  LINEAR PROGRAMMING RESULTS 













 Note: (9,8) is the Nash Equilibrium and is Pareto Optimal. 
 
Using mixed strategies (below), the solution is (1,2), with X playing (1) 100 percent of 




8y1+9y2+4y3-Vr >= 0 
3y1+2y2+y3-Vr >= 0 
y1-Vr >= 0 
y1+y2+y3 = 1 
Vr, Yi >= 0 
End 
No Action Covert Overt
GM 8,6 9,8 4,1
Coup 3,3 2,4 1,2
Ethnic 1,1 0,1 0,0
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LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP      0 
 
        OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE 
        1)      1.000000 
 
 VARIABLE  VALUE REDUCED COST 
 VR   1.000000 0.000000 
 Y1   1.000000 0.000000 
 Y2   0.000000 1.000000 
 Y3   0.000000 1.000000 
 VR, YI  0.000000 0.000000 
 
       ROW   SLACK OR SURPLUS     DUAL PRICES 
        2)         7.000000          0.000000 
        3)         2.000000          0.000000 
        4)         0.000000         -1.000000 
        5)         0.000000          1.000000 
        6)         0.000000          0.000000 
 
 NO. ITERATIONS=       0 
 
RANGES IN WHICH THE BASIS IS UNCHANGED: 
 
                           OBJ COEFFICIENT RANGES 
 VARIABLE         CURRENT        ALLOWABLE        ALLOWABLE 
   COEF  INCREASE DECREASE 
 VR  1.000000 INFINITY 1.000000 
 Y1  0.000000 INFINITY 1.000000 
 Y2  0.000000 1.000000 INFINITY 
 Y3  0.000000 1.000000 INFINITY 
 VR, YI 0.000000 0.000000 INFINITY 
 
                           RIGHTHAND SIDE RANGES 
      ROW         CURRENT        ALLOWABLE        ALLOWABLE 
  RHS  INCREASE DECREASE 
 2 0.000000 7.000000 INFINITY 
 3 0.000000 2.000000 INFINITY 
 4 0.000000 1.000000 2.000000 
 5 1.000000 INFINITY 1.000000 








6X1+3X2+X3-Vc >= 0 
8X1+4X2+X3-Vc >= 0 
X1+2X2-Vc >= 0 
X1+X2+X3 = 1 
Vc, Xi >= 0 
End 
 
 LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP      0 
 
        OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE 
        1)      2.000000 
 
 VARIABLE VALUE REDUCED COST 
 VC  2.000000 0.000000 
 X1  0.000000 1.000000 
 X2  1.000000 0.000000 
 X3  0.000000 2.000000 
 VC, XI 0.000000 0.000000 
 
       ROW   SLACK OR SURPLUS DUAL PRICES 
        2)         1.000000   0.000000 
        3)         2.000000   0.000000 
        4)         0.000000   -1.000000 
        5)         0.000000   2.000000 
        6)         0.000000   0.000000 
 
 NO. ITERATIONS=       0 
 
 RANGES IN WHICH THE BASIS IS UNCHANGED: 
 
                           OBJ COEFFICIENT RANGES 
 VARIABLE         CURRENT        ALLOWABLE        ALLOWABLE 
   COEF   INCREASE DECREASE 
 VC  1.000000 INFINITY 1.000000 
 X1  0.000000 1.000000 INFINITY 
 X2  0.000000 INFINITY 1.000000 
 X3  0.000000 2.000000 INFINITY 






                          RIGHTHAND SIDE RANGES 
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 ROW         CURRENT        ALLOWABLE        ALLOWABLE 
  RHS  INCREASE DECREASE 
 2 0.000000         1.000000 INFINITY 
 3 0.000000 2.000000 INFINITY 
 4 0.000000 2.000000 1.000000 
 5 1.000000 INFINITY 1.000000 
 6 0.000000 0.000000 INFINITY 
 
The linear programming solution for the decision variables, ie, the strategies to choose, 
were (x1,x2,x3)=(0,1,0) and (y1,y2,y3)=(1,0,0). We allow the payoff entry (x2,y1) to be 
the solution form linear programming, which is the value  (3,3). 
 
 85
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Akbarien, Mohammad  J. “The Protest Movement and Religious Seminaries: Green or 
Black?” gozaar.org, June 14, 2010. http://www.gozaar.org/english/articles-
en/The-Protest-Movement-and-Religious-Seminaries-Green-or-Black.html 
(accessed August 2, 2010).  
 
Alfoneh, Ali. “The Revolutionary Guards Role in Iranian Politics.” IranTracker.org, 
September 1,  2008. http://www.irantracker.org/military-activities/revolutionary-
guards-role-iranian-politics (accessed  March 5, 2010). 
 
———. “How Intertwined are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s Economy?” 
IranTracker.org, October 22,  2007. http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/how-
intertwined-are-revolutionary-guards-irans-economy (accessed March 5, 2010). 
 
“American Enterprise Insitute for Public Policy Research.” AEI.org, Februaury 12, 2010. 
http://www.irantracker.org/ analysis/regime %E2%80%99s-preemption-
assessing-february-11-protests-iran (accessed March 2, 2010). 
 
“An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public.” WorldPublicOpinion.org,  
Februaury 3,2010. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb10/ 
IranElection_Feb10_rpt.pdf (accessed May16, 2010). 
 
 Arian, Ardeshir. “The Seven-Point Manifesto of the Iranian Resistance.” 
pajamasmedia.com, June 16, 2010. http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/the-seven-
point-manifesto-of-the-iranian-resistance/ (accessed June 17, 2010). 
 
Biener, Hansjoerg. “The Arrival of Radio Farda.” Middle East Review of International 
Affairs (MERIA) Journal, vol. 7, no.1 (March 2003): 17.  
 
Bevilaccqua, Rachel. “Free Iran: The Time is Now.” revmagdalen.blogspot.com, 
December 6, 2009. http://revmagdalen.blogspot.com/2009/12/free-iran-the-time-
is-now.html (accessed February 20, 2010). 
 
“Civil Liberties.” Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civilliberties (accessed 
August 3, 2010). 
 
Clawson, Patrick. “Much Traction from Measured Steps: The Iranian Opposition, the 
Nuclear Issue, and the West.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
Policy Focus #100 (January 2010): 1. 
 
Cvach, David. “How to Assess Political Fissures in Iran.” washingtoninstitue.org, 
February 10, 2010. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php? 
CID=3173 (accessed February 10, 2010). 
 86
Dale, Helle and James Phillips. “Support for Iran’s Green Revolution Gains Traction in 
the Senate.” The Heritage Foundation 2806 (February 17, 2010): 1–2.  
 
Edwards, Bob and John D. McCarthy. “Resources and Social Movement Mobilization.” 
In The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. 
Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi 116-52. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004. 
 
“Failed and Fragile States.” Country Indicators for Foreign Policy.org, 
http://www.carleton.ca/cifp /app/ffs_data_methodology.php (accessed August 3, 
2010). 
 
“Failed State Index.” ForeignPolicy.com, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 2010/ 
06/21/2010 failed states index interactive mapandrankings (accessed August 4, 
2010). 
 
“Freedom of the Press.” FreedomHouse.org, http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
template.cfm? page=251& year =2002 (accessed 29 July, 2010). 
 
“The Fund For Peace.” FundForPeace.org, 2008. http://www.fundforpeace.org/web 
/index.php?option = comcontent&task=view&id=397&Itemid=556 (accessed 
March 4, 2010). 
 
“Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.” LabbickOnline.ir, http://www.labbaik.ir/en/ uploads 
/book/ Supreme% 20Leader%20of%20World.pdf (accessed March 18, 2010). 
 
“The Green Movement: Countering Objections.” revmagdalen.blogspot.com, November 
22, 2009. http:// revmagdalen.blogspot.com/2009/11/green-movement-
countering-objections.html  (accessed December 10, 2009). 
 
Gwertzman, Bernard. “From Conciliation to Coercion.” cfr.org, February 11, 2010. 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21427/from_conciliation_to_coercion.html  
(accessed February 15, 2010). 
 
 Hafez, Mohammad M. and Quintan Wiktorowicz. “Violence as Contention in the 
Egyptian Islamic Movement.” In Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory 
Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowizc, 61-88. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2004. 
 
Hawkins, Glenn. “The Green Revolution.” 451heat.com, June 22, 2009. 
http://51heat.com/2009/ 06/22/the-green-revolution/ (accessed on December 10, 
2009). 
 
“Human Development Report 2009—Iran.” UnitedNations.org, http://hdrstats.undp.org/ 
en/countries/ country  fact_sheets/cty_fs_IRN.html (accessed August 4, 2010). 
 
 87
“Human Rights.” www.state.gov, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/index.htm (accessed on 
April 12, 2010). 
 
 “Improved Water Source.” UnitedNations.org, http://data.un.org/Data. aspx?d= WDI&f 
= Indicator _Code % 3a SH.H2O.SAFE.ZS (accessed August 3, 2010). 
 
“Inflation, GDP Deflator (Annual%).” UnitedNations.org, http://data.un.org/ 
Data.aspx?q= iran&d=WDI-indicator_ code%3aNY.GDP. DEFL.KD.ZG%3 
bcountry _code%3aIRN (accessed March 8, 2010). 
 
 “Internet Users.” UnitedNations.org, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Iran&d =MDG&f 
=seriesRow ID% 3a 608%3bcountryID%3a364 (accessed March 8, 2010). 
 
“Iran.” fundforpeace.org, 2008. http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php? 
option=com_ content&task=view&id=397&Itemid=556  (accessed March 4, 
2010). 
 
“Iran.” www.state.gov, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm (accessed April 12, 
2010). 
 
“Iran Country Fact Sheet.” UnitedNationsHumanDevelopment.org, 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/ en/ countries /country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_IRN.html 
(accessed August 3, 2010). 
 
“Iran Country Profile.” loc.gov, May 2008.  http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/ 
Iran.pdf>.  (accessed March 2, 2010). 
 
“Iran-Islamic-Republic.” World Bank.org, 2010. http://data.worldbank.org/country/iran-
islamic-republic (accessed July 28, 2010). 
 
“Iran Sanctions: Options, Opportunities and Consequences.” www.brookings.edu, 
December 15, 2009. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/testimonies/ 
2009/1215_iran_sanctions_ maloney/1215iran _sanctions_maloney.pdf (accessed 
April 12, 2010). 
 
“Iranians: Do They Say They Want a Revolution?” WorldPublicOpinion.org, July 19, 
2007. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/ 
379.php?lb=brme&pnt=379&nid=&id= (accessed May 17, 2010). 
 
“Janes.” Janes.com, December 7, 2009. http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView 
.do ? docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2008/jir10416.htm@current 
&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=basij&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Sear
ch&Prod_Name=JIR& (accessed March 8, 2010). 
 
 88
“Joint Publication 3-13.” fas.org, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_13.pdf (accessed 
September 9, 2010). 
 
Kakaee, Parisa. “Women’s Movement: A Model for the Green Movement.” gozaar.org, 
June 11, 2010. http://www.gozaar.org/english/articles-en/Women-s-Movement-A-
Model-for-the-Green-Movement.html (accessed August 2, 2010). 
 
“Karroubi: Islamic Republic has Derailed from its Path.” en.irangreenvoice.com, May 
17, 2010. http://en.irangreenvoice.com/article/2010/may/17/1895  (accessed May 
20, 2010). 
 
Khalaji, Mehdi. “One Year after a Rigged Election: Iran’s Introverted Politics.” The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch #1667 (June 9, 2010): 1. 
 
Khorasani, Noushin A. “Iran’s Green Movement and the Myth of Shame of the Middle 
Class.” payvand.com, December 4, 2009. http://www.payvand.com/news/ 
09/dec/1043.html (accessed December 10, 2009). 
 
Leverett, Flynt and Hillary M. Leverett. “Iran’s Green Movement Approaches 
Irrelevance: Why Does Washington Continue to Gamble on It?” 
mideast.foreignpolicy.com, March 17, 2010. http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/ 
posts/2010/03/17/iran_s_green_movement_approaches_irrelevance_why_does_w
ashington_continue_to_gamble  (accessed March 19, 2010). 
 
Lynch, Marc. “So what now on Iran?” foreignpolicy.com, February 11, 2010. 
http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/11/so_what_now_on_iran (accessed 
February 15, 2010). 
 
Makhmalbaf, Hana. “Makhmalbaf Opens Up on the Green Movement.” Pbs.org, October 
14, 2009. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/10/ 
makhmalbaf-opens-up-on-green-movement.html  (accessed February 20, 2010). 
 
McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. “Introduction: Opportunities, 
mobilizing structures, and framing processes—toward synthetic, comparative 
perspective on social movements.” In Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, 1–20. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Milinski, Martin. “The Islamic Republic of Iran.” yaQoot.com, December 10, 2009.  
http://www.yaqoot.com/Iran.html (accessed February 25, 2010). 
 
Mohammadi, Efran. “Abbas Milani: Future of the Green Movement is Bright.” 
gozaar.org, June 11, 2010. http://www.gozaar.org/english/interview-en/Abbas-
Milani-Future-of-the-Green-Movement-is-Bright.html (accessed August 2, 2010). 
 
 89
Mohammadi, Majid. “Ten Green Movement Strategies to Make the Islamic Regime 
Yield.” gozaar.org, June 14, 2010. http://www.gozaar.org/english/articles-en/Ten-
Green-Movement-Strategies-to-Make-the-Islamic-Regime-Yield.html (accessed 
August 2, 2010). 
 
“Mousavi: Green Movement Eradicates Ignorance.” en.greenvoice.com, May 3, 2010. 
http://en.irangreenvoice.com/article/2010/may/03/1800 (accessed May 20, 2010). 
 
Myerson, Roger B. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1991. 
 
Naas, Charles “The ‘Greens’,” personal e-mail from author, March 24, 2010. 
 
Nesvanderani,Tara. “Iran’s Youth: The Protests are Not Over.” The United States 
Institute of Peace PeaceBrief 36 (June 8, 2010): 3. 
 
Nye, Joseph S. Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Cambridge, MA: 
Perseus Books Group, 2004. 
 
Okruhlik, Gwenn. “Making Conversation Permissible: Islamism and Reform in Saudi 
Arabia.” In Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan 
Wiktorowizc, 250-69. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. 
 
“Policy Issues.” www.state.gov, http://www.state.gov/policy/ (accessed April 12, 2010). 
 
Pollack, Kenneth, et al. Which Path to Persia?: Options for a New American Strategy 
toward Iran. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009. 
 
Popp, Roland. “Iran: Domestic Crisis and Options for the West.” CSS Analysis in 
Security Policy No. 59 (September 2009): 3. 
 
“The Price Paid for Blogging Iran.” BBC.co.uk, February 21, 2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4283231.stm (accessed September 9, 
2010). 
 
Reidel, Bruce. “Think Long, and Don’t get Boxed In.” bittermons-international.org, 
Middle East Roundtable ed. 10 vol. 8, (April 22, 2010): n.p. Robinson, Glenn E. 
“Hamas as a Social Movement.” In Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory 
Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowizc, 112-39. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2004. 
 
Rosen, Brianna. “The Trial Continue: Defection Not an Option.” irantracker.org, August 
14, 2009. http://irantracker.org/full-publication/trials-continue-defection-not-
option  (accessed December 10, 2009). 
 90
Rubin, Michael. “Irans Economy Runs out of Steam.” IranTracker.org, October 2008. 
http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/irans-economy-runs-out-steam (accessed 
March 5, 2010). 
 
Sadi, Waleed. “No Turning Back.” bittermons-international.org, Middle East Roundtable 
ed. 10 vol. 8, (April 22, 2010): n.p. 
 
Sadjadpour, Karim. Reading Khamenei. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 2008. 
 
Shahryar, Josh. “Can the U.S.. Help Iran’s Green Movement?” huffingtonpost.com, April 
3, 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-shahryar/can-the-us-help-irans-
gre_b_524168.html (accessed September 8, 2010). 
 
 Shojaii, Sadegh. “The Universities are Alive.” gozaar.org, June 11, 2010. 
http://www.gozaar.org/english/articles-en/The-Universities-are-Alive.html 
(accessed August 2, 2010). 
 
Shor, Mikhael. “Dictionary of Game Theory Terms : Pareto Optimal.” GameTheory .net, 
http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/ ParetoOptimal.html (accessed October 28, 
2010). 
 
Singerman, Diane. “The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements.” In Islamic 
Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowizc, 143–
63. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004.  
 
“State Sponsors of Terrorism: Iran.” www.state.gov, April 30, 2009. 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ rls/crt/ 2008/122436.htm (accessed on April 12, 2010). 
 
“The Supreme Leaders Generation of Wealth.” The Center for Publishing and Preserving 
the Works of the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, http://english.khamenei.ir// 
index.php?option=com_ content&task =view &id =1230 &Itemid=13 (accessed 
May 20, 2010). 
 
Tahavori, Mohammad. “Interview with Dr. Banuazizi: About the Green Movement.” 
gozaar.org, December 29, 2009. http://www.gozaar.org/template1.php?id=1403& 
language=english.html (accessed February 20, 2010). 
 
Thaler, David E, Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerold D Green, and Charlotte Lynch. 
Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010. 
 
“UN Security Council Resolution 1540.” www.state.gov, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/ 
c18943.htm (accessed on April 12, 2010). 
 91
Wickham, Carrie R. “Interests, Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt.” In Islamic 
Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowizc, 231-
49. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. 
 
Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory.” 
In Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan 
Wiktorowizc, 1-33. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. 
 
Wehrey, Frederic, et al. The Rise of the Pasdaran. Santa Monica, Ca: RAND 
Corporation, 2009. 
 
 “World Bank Iran.” WorldBank.org, http://ddp-xt.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ View 
Shared Report?&CF =1&REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE 
=VIEWADVANCED&HF=N&WSP=N  (accessed March 5, 2010). 
 
“The World Fact Book: Iran.” CIA.gov, January 26, 2010. https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/ the-world-fact book/geos/ir.html (accessed February 15, 
2010). 
 
 “World Food Program.” WFP.org, 2009. http://www.wfp.org/countries/Iran (acessed 20 
March, 2010). 
 
Wright, Robin. “Abdolkarim Soroush: The Goals of Iran’s Green Movement.” 
csmonitor.com, January 6, 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/ 
Opinion/2010/0106/ Abdolkarim-Soroush-The-goals-of-Iran-s-reen-Movement  
(accessed January 8, 2010). 
 
Yaghmaian, Behzad. “Iran’s Green Movement Spreading Despite Crackdown.” 
payvand.com, November 15, 2009. http://payvand.com/news/09/nov/1157.html 
(accessed February 19, 2010). 
 
Yavuz, M. Hakan. “Opportunity Spaces, Identity, and Islamic Meaning in Turkey.” In 
Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan 
Wiktorowizc, 270-88. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. 
 
Zakaria, Fareed. “McCain’s Mistake.” Newsweek, June 28 & July 5, 2010: 24. 
 
Zarif, Maseh. “Escalating Confrontation on Ashura.” irantracker.org, December 29, 
2009. http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/escalating-confrontation-ashura 
(accessed on January 10, 2010). 
 92
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 93
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
